Strike Warfare is the art form that supports the power projection mission. Although all the warfare areas are art forms to the aficionado, Strike Warfare is elevated above the others in many practitioners’ minds because it requires precise coordination and timing. Like an orchestra conductor, the strike planner must blend a number of diverse elements into a harmonious whole, building to a crescendo designed to leave a lasting impact on the recipient of the art.

The audience of the strike planner may consist of enemy surface or ground forces, each requiring a slightly different finesse in prosecution. The tools of the strike planner are expendable assets (i.e.: missiles) and retrievable assets (i.e.: manned aircraft). Fiscal realities force a limited supply of each asset, but the latter are more significant because they may be employed repeatedly, provided the strike planner has performed his duties correctly. We will now arm the Harpoon II strike commander with all of the skills necessary for mastery of this art.

Every strike plan is composed of several steps. The commander must progress through each of these in the formulation of a viable plan. In order of execution, the elements requiring consideration are as follows:

1. Target Value
2. Target Location, Composition, and Defenses
3. Strike Composition, Armament, and Support
4. Ingress and Egress Routes
5. Timing of the Strike
6. Battle Damage Assessment (BDA)

Each of these elements will be examined in detail below. For the purpose of continuity, a land strike is assumed. Special considerations for strikes against naval task forces in support of the ASuW mission are discussed in that warfare section. As you progress through the text, remember that, although each topic is examined individually, none of them operates exclusively of the others. In the formulation of a plan, if you are unsatisfied with your assessment of any of the planning steps, then it is generally wisest to scrap the plan until the limiting factor that gave you pause has been eliminated.

One of the inherent advantages afforded the strike planner is that of timing and initiative. Because his is a proactive rather than reactive commitment of force, he has the ability to decide when and where this should occur. Keeping that thought in mind, the second point to ensure is the strategic value of the target. For the commander to be willing to commit portions of his force to the destruction or reduction of a target, the target must have some significance to the achievement of mission objectives. While this may seem a moot point, in reality it is a common mistake.

Remember the earlier point that the conduct of war is never static; while one is attacking, one must also guard. With this axiom in mind, consider astute opponent Blue, who offers a sacrificial lamb to the strike planner, Orange, who is closing Blue’s coast to attack a port or airfield. This offering might take many forms, but we will consider it to be an attractive surface action group that is out of position to contribute to the immediate tactical situation. As Orange nears his primary objective, Blue directs the SAG to radiate and make its presence known. Blue hopes that the SAG, though not an immediate threat to Orange, will prove so tempting a target that it cannot be passed up. If Orange complies with Blue’s deception and commits a significant portion of his strike package to the target of opportunity, he has unwittingly shifted the tactical advantage of initiative to Blue.

As a minimum, Blue will delay the attack on the prime objective and attrit portions of Orange’s strike package directed at the SAG. This reduces the number of missiles and aircraft available for Orange’s subsequent efforts against the primary target, which increases Blue’s chance of survival. In the optimum case of this deceptive effort, however, Blue is now in position to strike Orange’s main force first, while his attention and the bulk of his forces are directed elsewhere. Blue could be decisive in this action or, even if marginally successful, his efforts could reduce the Orange force to the point that its commander deems it unwise to continue operations against the Blue base. While this case illustrates a potential use of strategic deception, the required lesson for the strike commander in Harpoon Il is to ensure that the target of your efforts support the mission objective; don’t attack something just because it seems to be an easy target.

Although strike planning against fixed targets like port facilities and airbases is simplified due to their lack of mobility, location and composition still require analysis. The location of a target is important because it determines both the line of demarcation of the striking force and the envelopes of engagement of supporting forces. The line of demarcation is the maximum range at which a strike commander can begin to employ force on the intended target. Because this line reflects the extended ranges of attack aircraft at reduced weapons loads, it is most often not the effective strike range. To obtain the maximum effective strike range, the commander must consider the feasibility of in-flight refueling for all of the fully loaded strike elements he has determined necessary to conduct the strike. The inverse of the line of demarcation is the maximum engagement envelope of enemy long range air assets and land based surface-to-surface missile systems. Within this context, it should be apparent that the strike commander must not only be concerned with the capabilities of the targeted base, but must also consider the proximity of other bases to the target which could multiply enemy defenses.

The composition of land targets has also been modified considerably in Harpoon Il. Previously, the commander faced a generic AAA capability, a radar, and runway-based aircraft. In Harpoon Il, bases possess discrete targetable components. There are individual SAM and AAA sites, ground radar installations, command and control bunkers, weapons storage bunkers, fuel and oil storage facilities, hangers, runways, and other support facilities. The destruction of any of these targets will impede the enemy commander in performing the relevant functions until repairs are affected.

Strike planning now requires the commander to divide components of the striking force to deal with each of these elements in turn. Although it may seem that this complicates the strike planning process (and it does to some degree), it also provides greater flexibility in terms of tailoring strikes to support specific needs. For example, if one is attempting to preclude a secondary base from supporting the object of a main attack, it isn’t necessary to strike that base’s runways to keep aircraft on the ground. The naval commander will seldom have enough aircraft and missile resources on hand to conduct a simultaneous attack on two or more land facilities. The strike package aimed at the secondary base may consist exclusively of jamming and fighter aircraft. The jammers can confuse the command & control of the base’s radar picture, engage active radars with home-on-radiation missiles (HARM) and distract airborne interceptors away from the main group. The fighters can conduct an offensive sweep of the interceptors, again to preclude their efforts to support the base which is the object of the primary attack.

Another example of this approach would be a strike targeted specifically at the weapons bunkers of an installation. If destroyed, the enemy would have only those assets at the SAM sites or already on the hardpoints of aircraft to conduct further offensive or defensive operations. Plus, there is always the chance of some beneficial secondary explosions. As you can see, the possibilities are endless. As a strike commander in Harpoon Il, the important thing to remember for this phase is to match the specific target types to the mission requirements and to always remain aware of both the line of demarcation and the enemy’s zones of engagement.

All developed nations of the world employ some form of IADS (Integrated Air Defense System) to govern their air defense network. Although the sophistication of IADS networks varies with the technological capability and economic resources of the nation modeled, the basic components of an IADS system remain the same.

At the heart of the system is the command & control bunker(s), the number of which depends on the number of assets to be managed and the area covered. Multiple bunkers imply a chain of command between the least secure (i.e.: those managing front line assets) and the most secure (i.e.: regional and national command sites). Each bunker coordinates the efforts of two or more of the following assets: fighter/ interceptors, radar sites, and SAM and AAA batteries. The deployment of the latter three may be fixed or mobile. Naturally, the presence of mobile assets complicates strike planning, and the commander must make every effort to have the most reliable intelligence on enemy force dispositions as the plan is developed. To ensure the success of the strike, and minimize losses during the strike, the commander must evaluate enemy IADS capabilities and suppress or destroy these defenses as a part of the strike package.

With a firm grasp of the aforementioned factors, the commander may now analyze what elements of the force are best suited to conduct the mission and what weaponry they will carry to do so. In discussing these dispositions, one will hear references to the strike force, the strike group, and the strike element. Understanding their relationship is important. A strike element is a single sortie group of 1-6 aircraft of the same type. Strike elements may be larger, but it is generally not advisable, as this simplifies enemy intercept and counter-targeting efforts. Strike groups are composed of all strike elements, regardless of type, originating from the same unit. A strike force is all of the assembled strike groups that will attack the same target, regardless of their point of origin.

Some targets may be prosecuted by a single strike element, such as a pair of Harpoon-equipped A-6 Intruders engaging a group of missile patrol boats operating outside the enemy air defense envelope. In this scenario, since the weapons of the strike aircraft outdistance the range of the enemy’s best AAW weapon, and the strike planner need not be concerned with enemy air intercept, a small aircraft group is sufficient to deliver decisive force. Other targets may require the coordination of all aircraft and Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAM) within one or more CVBG's to penetrate and saturate enemy defenses. The more sophisticated the IADS, the more diverse your approach must become.

Consider the approach adopted by the Coalition Command at the outset of the air war against Iraq. Iraq’s IADS at the commencement of hostilities was estimated by Intelligence to be seven times more lethal than the one deployed around Hanoi at the height of the Vietnam War. Hanoi’s concentration of SAM sites virtually precluded low-level precise delivery of munitions throughout the war due to unacceptable loss estimates, yet Iraq's system exacted 1/3 the casualty rate per 1,000 sorties during Operation Desert Shield/ Desert Storm. The reason behind this seeming inconsistency between expectations and results lies in the systematic reduction of Iraq's IADS through proper strike planning.

Major General John Corder, U.S. Air Force, Director of Central Command Air Operations, employed a comprehensive, yet easy-tounderstand, approach. Harpoon Il commanders should use it as a guideline in their planning of major coordinated strikes by diverse elements. The precursor of the attack was a massive barrage of communications and radar jamming by coalition aircraft. The waves of strike aircraft operating with supporting fighter escort. With their eyes and ears destroyed, however, all shots fired at aircraft by these facilities were unguided and, therefore, inaccurate. The results of successful planning, timing, and coordination are telling: one F/A 18 lost on the night of the strike for virtual destruction of an entire nation’s air defense system.jammers remained in position to engage and destroy enemy radar sites with HARM, ALARM and other anti-radiation homers as they went active. From behind the wall of electronic noise emerged 100 TLAM's directed at fixed radar sites and command & control facilities. F117’s supplemented the TLAM’s against the most hardened facilities and succeeded in severing the head from the IADS structure. Lacking central coordination and targeting information, the remaining pieces of the IADS were left to operate independently against the successive

As was mentioned previously, it is critical for the strike planner to make every effort to ensure survivability of retrievable assets. One of the simplest methods of doing so is to plot ingress and egress routes for the strikes to avoid ancillary defenses, remain undetected for as long as possible, and minimize the time spent within the enemy zone of engagement. In the next few paragraphs, we will highlight how to accomplish these simple, yet often overlooked, tactics.

Although it is not always possible, due to the overlapping nature of defensive air networks, the strike planner should strive to avoid entering the weapons envelopes of units other than the primary target, and avoid theirs as well if sufficient stand off weapons exist. To do so, refer frequently to the tactical overlays provided for the Harpoon Il map.

Plot air group movement to avoid overlapping circles of enemy air coverage. Further, if you must pass through these circles, do so as close to tangentially as possible. This approach presents the enemy with a long range crossing shot, the least effective possible engagement posture.

Also, one may note that many coastal facilities now have ecliptic cones of radar coverage versus circles to more closely reflect their real world counterparts. For an equivalent signal strength, a directional radar has much greater range than an omni-directional radar. Since a threat is perceived to be coming from outside the country’s borders, as opposed to within, the focal point of these radars will be directed off shore and the portion of the ellipse behind the installation may be tens of miles deep rather than hundreds. When this occurs, if the strike planner has the opportunity to cross the enemy coast elsewhere and strike these targets from behind, it is always a sound tactical move to do so with at least one strike element, if not more.

When the transit phase is complete and forces are in position to conduct the attack, then the planner should allow for a direct path from the edge of the enemy weapons envelope to the launch range and back again. This approach minimizes the time during which strike elements may be counter-attacked. Further, by adopting a multipleaxis attack (some of which can be deceptive groups), the strike planner spreads the enemy defenses among the strike elements, which again increases the chance of success.

Remember also that, to be targeted, one must be detected. The longer the strike planner can delay that detection, the more survivable the strike elements become and the greater chance of success for the strike force as a whole. The primary methods of influencing these variables in the Harpoon II model are via altitude assignment and EMCON posture. The section on electronic warfare should have emphasized the tactical trade-offs related to EMCON posture adequately, so we will focus exclusively on altitude affects here.

Radars are essentially horizon dependent when it comes to maximum range. This fact explains why a surface search radar has very limited maximum range in comparison to an air search radar, some of which are capable of detecting inbound aircraft at hundreds of miles, provided the aircraft are above the radar horizon. To understand the importance of the radar horizon, consider the depiction in Figure 9.


Figure 9: The effect of altitude on the detection ranges of radars.

Both elements are from the same strike group and are 150nm from their intended target, represented by the generic surface ship. Note that the higher aircraft are already detected by the air search radar of the target, because, by being at high altitude, they are above the radar horizon. The other aircraft, however, are operating at very low altitude. As a result, they will not cross the radar horizon until about 25nm from the target, minimizing enemy reaction time and allowing for a more effective attack. If the lower aircraft were cruise missiles instead of aircraft, this range could be even shorter, on the order of 15nm, because of the extremely small radar profile and sea skimming altitude of the missile.

Note that the radar horizon generally extends beyond the visual in the lower atmosphere, particularly at sea level. This phenomena would be insignificant if it did not have tactical implications. Remembering that radar requires the reflection and return of the transmitted signal to the antenna, the strongest returns are generated in the center of the transmitted waves. Argentine A-4 pilots utilized this knowledge to perfect low level approach patterns during the Falklands War. In essence, what they did was adopt a very low profile similar to the lower aircraft in the preceding example. As soon as the ESM threat warning gear lit up, however, to indicate their crossing of the radar horizon, they would drop in altitude. The momentary exposure was insufficient for British radar operators to discern the contact and skilled Argentinian pilots were able to conduct this maneuver up to three times on a standard approach at progressively closer ranges. The technique came to be known as “pecking the lobe”, and it was employed with great success to compress the battle space and reaction time afforded the British commander. Were it not for fusing delays associated with the Iron Bombs carried by the A-4s, it is very likely that many more hulks of British warships would litter the ocean bottom around the Falklands.

In larger strike packages, it is necessary that the commander divide these forces into distinct groups and elements, and assign each a mission that supports the concerted effort. This practice increases the survivability of individual elements, as the enemy’s countertargeting is complicated and decreases the amount of ordnance lost due to jettisoning when the enemy does intercept, but it also complicates the coordination effort of the strike planner. As noted in the beginning of this section, the strike planner is analogous to an orchestra conductor. In that role, if even one element of the whole fails to show up on time, or plays out of concert with the others, the entire movement is jeopardized.

The easiest method of establishing the timeline for the strike is to work it backwards, from the moment the last weapon would be delivered to the launch times for the various elements. The planner can discount flight deck limitations to a degree in the Harpoon Il model, as the staff assistant allows for the assembly of each strike element in loiter before proceeding to target. The critical considerations will be missile time of flight (if one is using these assets as a part of the strike package), aircraft time of flight (which can vary between strike elements if the planner has implemented circuitous maneuver or a multiple axis attack), and weapons time of flight for the aircraft armament packages selected. Naturally, if one is using point weapons like free fall bombs and munitions canisters, this latter consideration can be discounted. Otherwise, with guided or precision munitions, their time of flight must be considered.

By starting with a time of impact and considering weapons’ flight time, including TLAMs, from the selected launch points, the commander knows what time the launch platforms must arrive at those points. When this is known, the commander can again work backward along the plotted movement leg for each aircraft element and determine when they must clear the deck to commence the mission. The objective of all this number crunching is to achieve a condition known as Simultaneous Time On toP (STOP), the equivalent of strike planner’s nirvana. When STOP occurs, it means that all of a strike’s ordnance arrives at the same instant, which is guaranteed to saturate the most cohesive enemy defenses.

After any attack, the commander must conduct reconnaissance to assess the effectiveness of the attack and determine the need for any follow-up attacks on the same target. If manned aircraft were part of the strike package, then an initial assessment of the damage inflicted will be provided. This assessment may be inaccurate, and the commander can refine its authenticity (in the case of ASuW attacks) by including a reconnaissance aircraft as one of the last elements to enter the target area. In strikes against land based targets, the commander may obtain accurate satellite data on the effectiveness of his strikes after a period of a few hours.

Strike Warfare is the heart of power projection. All strike warfare planning must progress through the six steps delineated above. The commander ensures that sufficient force exists to accomplish the mission while husbanding limited resources. Understanding the strengths and limitations of the enemy IADS, as well as the strategic placement of those forces, is essential to planning. There may be some application of force prior to the main strike, such as the HARM attacks discussed previously, but the prudent commander will always plan the main effort to STOP the enemy dead in his tracks.

Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) posture should be a constant concern of the naval commander, as a missile threat can materialize from all types of contact: surface, subsurface, or air. Further, with anti-surface missile speeds ranging from subsonic, in the case of sea skimmers like TASM, to Mach 4, like the HARM, an AAW threat may present an attack window with engagement time measured in seconds. If the commander has not invested the forethought and planning to be in position to take advantage of the period of vulnerability, the missile strikes home and further actions, even the destruction of the launch platform, are academic.

In determining the AAW force posture, the commander must remember the tactical axiom to “Shoot the Archer, not the Arrow”, whenever possible. If the Rule of Engagement (ROE) and other constraints allow, it is always better to engage the firing platform before it reaches its launch point, thereby killing many missiles with a single attack, instead of attempting to deal with groups of multiple inbound missiles. Although this is the optimum case, it is not always attainable. As a result, the prudent commander balances the effort and resources committed to the outer air battle just described, with those necessary to provide cohesive mutual support in the inner air battle.

To illustrate the conduct of the inner and outer air battles, we must return to our earlier comparisons of the inferior and superior force. In the case of an inferior force, which has adopted dispersal as the best tactic, AAW defense is a single unit or small group proposition. In essence, it is every man for himself, and the best chance for survival in the face of enemy air superiority is to avoid detection in the first place. Conversely, remember that superior forces favor concentration and massing for mutual defense, which fits the more complicated model of integrated AAW at sea.

For the remainder of this section, the case of the superior force commander is assumed.

Before examining the flow of events that occur in the outer and inner air battles, the commander must become fluent in the technical constraints which govern the employment of Surface-to-Air Missile systems (SAMs). The majority of the world’s surface-to-air missile systems employ semi-active homing for in-flight guidance and course corrections. Semi-active homers require the firing platform to actively illuminate the target throughout the intercept with a missile fire control director. The number of directors a ship possesses governs the number of intercepts that may be simultaneously prosecuted. Thus, as a rule, director assignments are more limiting than launcher cycle rates in evaluating engagement potential. If the guiding radar shuts down for any reason, such as attempting to avoid an inbound HARM or being struck by the same, then all defensive missiles in flight self-destruct.

The exception to the aforementioned limitations is the Aegis fire control suite employed by the Ticonderoga and Arleigh Burke class ships. The SPY-1 radar system employs phased-array and timesharing technology to allow simultaneous tracking and targeting of hundreds of contacts and each of the four array faces can manage three missiles in flight. This means that the Aegis platform suffers none of the delays associated in switching between targets and can manage 12 missiles in a 360 degree area of coverage at any instant. Further, as an intercept is completed, if other targets remain, the system can automatically and instantaneously put another missile in the air from the vertical launch system to refill the engagement queue.

Also, because the SM2-MR missile possesses an inertial mode, if the guiding radar shuts down for any reason, all missiles in flight will continue on their last course until an intercept occurs or fuel is expended. Maneuvering aircraft can, as a rule, escape this “death gasp”, but non-maneuvering missiles will generally still be intercepted. Given these capabilities, it is not surprising to see why Aegis is referred to as “The Guardian of the Fleet”.

The first consideration for proper AAW management is Airborne Early Warning (AEW). If you cannot see them coming outside their launch points, then the outer air battle is already lost, and the commander is forced to play catch up in the inner screen. The premier platform for AEW is the E-3 AWACs, but it is constrained by being a land-based asset. If they are available, use these aircraft to the maximum extent possible. If not, E-2 Hawkeyes are the weapon of choice to keep savvy CVBG Commanders apprised of the air threat. A well positioned E-2 eliminates the need for the CVBG to use active emissions altogether, thereby confounding the enemy’s targeting efforts. He will know you are in the area, because E-2s don’t materialize out of thin air, but he won't be able to localize your ships well enough to attack them without resorting to methods other than ESM.

To employ one of these AEW assets, station it in a race track loiter pattern covering the area of interest. In the case of a rapidly transiting CVBG, for example, this might be 100nm ahead on the PIM. Also, since there are a limited number of these valuable aircraft, and they are very vulnerable to enemy intercept, it is always prudent to also provide one or two fighters to escort the AEW platform.

The primary player in the outer air battle is the fighter/ interceptor aircraft on a Combat Air Patrol (CAP) mission. CAP may originate from a CVBG or a land base. Further, CAP may protect their unit of origin or any other unit. CAP assets stationed to protect units other than their home base are known as LOng Range Combat Air Patrol (LORCAP) assets.

The proper positioning of CAP or LORCAP is to either side of the expected threat axis at 160-180nm from the units to be protected. Use the loiter command to prolong their time on station and reduce the amount of relief CAP that must be launched. From this vantage point, the CAP assets will usually be in position to engage incoming groups with AA missiles, destroying portions of strike elements and possibly causing others to jettison their ordnance to increase maneuverability and survivability. The pilot’s dictum is that it is far better to flee and fight another day than press forward with a suicidal or nondecisive attack. When this latter case occurs, it equates to a “mission kill”, even if the CAP does not succeed in eliminating any of the inbound aircraft.

Players must watch these engagements closely and dispatch relief CAP to the units on station as soon as they occur, so that follow up waves of attack aircraft are met with full weapons loads. Once inbound aircraft have penetrated the outer defenses, the player may have a second opportunity to engage them with CAP aircraft in ready5 (ready to launch quickly) status, but the bulk of them will become the responsibility of formation AAW assets.

In this area, the player has a little latitude tactically. Within the main body, shooters should be positioned such that they can provide a layered defense and overlapping coverage to protect the high value unit(s) (HVU), which is usually the CV, LPH, LCC, support ship, or merchant group. Each class of AAW ship usually has several methods of defeating inbound aircraft or missiles, including either long or medium range missile systems and point defense systems like Phalanx. They also have electronic countermeasures, which provide a “soft kill” on missiles by luring them away from their actual targets to explode harmlessly over the ocean.

To protect the HVU, the optimum position for the firing platform is directly between the HVU and the inbound missile group. The reason for this constraint relates to the probability of kill (Pk) for the missile as a factor of the aspect of engagement. Although the ship is plotted with a circle denoting maximum effective range of the AAW weapon system, when viewed with Pk in mind, the circle becomes an ellipse. The highest percentage shot is against a directly inbound missile (Figure 10). As one nears the tangent or closest point of approach of a missile flying past the ship (known as a crossing shot), regardless of range, the Pk drops under 20%, as a rule. This reduction is because the relative motion of the intercept is at the peak speed, and most AAW missiles cannot do course trajectory changes fast enough to complete the intercept for a crossing shot as just described. As the missile continues toward other ships in the formation, the defenders may obtain an opportunity for one more attack on the missile. These tail chase engagements have a slightly higher Pk than crossing shots, but they are still below acceptable standards.


Figure 10: Pk-biased weapons envelopes.

Given the aforementioned Pk considerations, main body positioning of AAW assets becomes even more critical. A good rule of thumb is to place Aegis-equipped ships in close proximity to the HVU, while placing lesser shooters (DDGs and FFGs) in sectors between 16-24 thousand yards from the main body on either side of the threat axis. In groups of sufficient size, where an outer screen is employed as well, AAW assets should be spaced one sector width farther away from the threat axis than inner screen units, at 18-24nm from the formation center. This allows AAW units to be interspersed with the ASW units of the outer screen and also affords a greater degree of protection from AAW attacks somewhat off the main threat axis. Naturally, the more reliably you predict the axis of attack, the more effective your units will be in the subsequent inner air battle.

More sophisticated tactics involve the use of AAW picket ships in either a missile trap or silent SAM configuration. When the tactical situation dictates that the main body adopt an active emission posture (i.e.: their detection and localization is assured to enemy forces), positioning one or two cruisers 100-150 NM from the main body on the threat axis in total emission silence is ideal. In this configuration, the cruiser(s) can act as a missile trap, going active with their search radars on when the incoming raid has been detected by other means and is within their engagement envelope. The hazard to this tactic is that, once these assets go active and are detected, they lack mutual defensive support and become vulnerable to individual attack.

Silent SAM is similar in terms of stationing distance, but it is a tactic that never requires the shooter to illuminate the target. Cruisers equipped with the New Threat Upgrade (NTU) SM2ER missile can receive targeting data from other sources and shoot inbound aircraft silently 75-90nm from their position, which equates to 175-240nm from formation center depending on their station. Because these assets remain electronically silent throughout the attack, their survivability in an extended picket station is greater than the conventional cruiser employing missile trap tactics.


Figure 11: Carrier Battle Group traveling east with AAW Threat Axis to northeast.

Occasionally, it is beneficial for the force commander to calculate the defensive power of a unit against missile attack, particularly when making stationing decisions. A reasonably accurate, yet simple to obtain, method of obtaining these figures follows.

Take each ship of the force and examine its AAW weapons systems.

Assign numeric values to the following attributes based upon factors listed in the Harpoon Il database.

A = The maximum number of intercepts per engagement cycle

B = The number of engagement cycles based on maximum range

c = The base Pk value of the missile system

D = The effective number of engagements.

Manipulation of these variables yields the equation:

AxBxC=D

Assign B a value of 1 for short range shooters (i.e.: 25nm or less), 1.5 for medium shooters (30-45nm) and 2.5 for long range shooters like the SM2 ER used in the earlier example. Continuing that example here, let’s assign a value of 4 to variable A, to reflect the number of directors and a base Pk to the missile of 80%. By inputting these numbers we arrive at the following value:

4x2.5x.8=8

Thus, we have determined that an SM2 ER unit should be capable of engaging 8 inbound targets with its missile system alone. As a rule of thumb, if the unit is the subject of the attack, one may be added to D for the presence of a point defense system, such as Phalanx, one may be added for chaff, and one may be added if the unit has defensive ECM capability such as that provided by the SLQ-32. Thus, a Leahy or Belknap class, if optimally positioned, could increase force defensive posture by 8 kills, yet has a higher saturation value of 11 in defending against an attack on itself. Beyond that, any surviving missiles will strike their target.

AAW gun systems are discounted for all classes when considering missiles, as the constraints related to proximity fuzing make such employment a low Pk proposition. Their effectiveness is higher against manned aircraft, provided the latter are cooperative enough to fly within the relatively short zone of engagement.

Finally, the commander must understand that these estimates assume early detection of the threat, so that the first engagement occurs at the maximum effective range of the SAM system. When the enemy succeeds in compressing the battlespace using one or more of the tactics discussed throughout this manual, reaction time and the maximum number of AAW engagements are reduced considerably.

The AAW commander must constantly update the threat axis to reflect the most reliable intelligence available. In formation considerations, invest the time necessary to actually analyze the capability of your own force’s units. Balance resources between the outer and inner air battles, but strive to shoot the archer, not the arrow, whenever possible. Finally, station assets relative to the threat axis with Pk-biased weapons envelopes in mind. This tactic will increase your chances of living up to the Aegis motto: “If it flies, it dies.”

ASuW is slightly more difficult than AAW, because one must invest more time establishing hostile intent and refining the over-thehorizon targeting solution. Several factors must be considered when one is contemplating an ASuW strike, including target composition, delivery platforms, which ordnance package(s) will best accomplish the job, and timing. Because surface units begin with a limited number of ASuW weapons, it is generally advisable to husband these resources if air groups are available to prosecute the attack.

Not just any air group constitutes an appropriate strike, however. Proper strike planning requires the player to consider the enemy’s defenses and the amount of ordnance that must be delivered to achieve the objective of the strike. Weapon types must be matched to target types, but, more importantly, the strike aircraft must be given a reasonable chance of reaching their launch points.

In the previous section, the player viewed an ASuW strike from the receiving end, with the goal of destroying that strike before it could prove decisive. In this section, we will reverse roles and capitalize upon this new found AAW expertise to exploit it for our own purposes. The Harpoon Il commander must learn how to evaluate enemy defenses and develop a plan to overwhelm them in support of the ASuW mission area, first through air assets and then with surface ships.

Since enemy surface task forces are mobile, the first step to prosecuting them is to find them. Some guidance has already been provided on passive cross-fixing, which is a form of Over-The-Horizon (OTH) targeting, in the section on electronic warfare. As such, this section is designed to supplement that information by discussing the role of ship based helicopters in OTH targeting.

As a stand-alone search platform without any initial locating information on the enemy force, the helicopter has limited effectiveness. Armed with even a single ESM detection of a sensor on a platform of interest, however, the helicopter can begin a line of bearing search to attempt to acquire that target. If the helicopter flies out the line of bearing to its maximum radius and doesn’t discover anything, it was not a wasted journey. At least the tactical commander has good reason to assume that the enemy platform is beyond that maximum range.

Helicopters are best employed, however, when a rough area of probability has been obtained on the enemy force, such as when they are radiating intermittently. In this instance, the helicopter approaches the area of probability from off axis, so as not to provide the enemy a line of bearing to its launch platform should it be discovered. Once the pilot estimates that he could be above the radar horizon (see the strike warfare section for a full explanation of this concept) of the enemy group should they radiate, he must slow down and reduce elevation.

For the duration of the approach, the helicopter should fly slowly and under 50 feet to make detection difficult, using their small radar and visual cross section to remain undetected, even when within sight of the formation being targeted, and while maintaining a directional data link back to the parent platform. If these same helicopters are also ASuW missile capable, such as the British Lynx, then the commander may use them to conduct the first pulse of his strike package from their undetected position at short range. Indeed, such tactics proved devastating to the Iraqi Navy during Operation Desert Storm, which has prompted considerable open debate by policy makers in other purely coastal navies.

Alternately, the helicopter may conduct a search tactic known as jumping jacks. From the standard search profile of 150 feet at cruising speed, the helicopter pops up to between 500 and 1000 feet, does a visual scan and a couple of quick radar sweeps; if nothing is spotted, then it dives down to the deck again. The process is repeated about every 7-9nm during the search at the pilot’s discretion. This tactic puts the helicopter at greater risk but increases the scouted area.

Commensurate with the effort to refine the targeting solution for the conduct of an ASuW strike, the commander must also classify the composition of the enemy force to the best of his ability. The more accurate this assessment, which is based on the correlation of sensor and bearing information (as explained in the Electronic Warfare section), the more correctly the commander may determine the defensive power of the formation to be targeted.

When several asset types are possible, the prudent commander always assumes the worst case scenario. Applying this logic to all of the discrete platforms that have been detected, the commander comes up with a composite picture of the enemy force. Using the Harpoon II database and the formula presented to calculate a ship’s AAW capability, the commander can reliably estimate the required saturation level for the intelligence composite he has developed. Armed with this knowledge, the commander may begin strike planning in earnest. One note of caution must be mentioned, however: The saturation estimates are only as accurate as the classifications of the target types. It is possible to either overestimate, wasting precious weapons, or underestimate, endangering the strike elements themselves.

Once the target has been classified and targeted, the commander must have a strike package ready to assign to the threat. We have already noted that it is best to conduct ASuW strikes with air assets, whenever possible. Bearing that advice in mind, let us consider a strike against an enemy CVBG, to illustrate one possible composition and approach. First, you should launch 4-8 fighters in two groups on patrol missions in the area you expect to encounter enemy CAP. You cannot launch them on strike missions because their ordnance does not match the target type. Immediately following this, the commander should launch all ARM or HARM capable aircraft to engage any air search radars that go active in the target group. If these units succeed in blinding the enemy, the remainder of the air groups will have a milk run. Follow this with the main body of the strike force, employing stand-off and guided munitions. Iron bombs should be reserved strictly to mop up critically wounded ships after the main attack or, in the case of limited air resources, as weapons of last resort. Concurrent with the fighter sweep, but as a discrete group, the commander may also commit electronics support aircraft, such as the EA-6B, increasing the survivability of the strike as a whole. If several types of strike aircraft will be used, each should be launched as a separate group, to complicate the enemy’s AAW effort and maximize the chances of the strike achieving its objective.

When air assets are unavailable to prosecute the target, surface forces must consider other factors to maximize their attacks. It is important to ensure that you have a refined, complete targeting solution prior to committing the limited assets in the magazine.

Further, you must be certain of the composition of the target group. Do you know they are hostile? Will the number of weapons you are about to employ ensure saturation, based on the intelligence you have at that point? If the answer to either of these questions is no, then hold off on the attack. If you are certain that conditions are right to proceed, the next step is to establish both the timeline and the axis of the attack.

The timeline is easy to calculate using the method delineated in the Strike Warfare section. As noted there, when coordinating multiple firing platforms, the objective should be to obtain simultaneous time on top to saturate the enemy defenses. In considering the axis of attack, firing straight down the bearing to the target may be the fastest method of getting ordnance on the target, but it also allows the enemy to shoot a bearing only attack down the reciprocal course of the inbound missiles once he detects them. This is known as a “quick shot” and it is an exercise practiced routinely by surface ships. It is rarely a conclusive attack, but if fired down the correct bearing (i.e.: the original shooters did not fire off axis), it can force the enemy ships to bring up the AAW radars. This tactic would allow surviving members of the original target group to quickly counterattack with any remaining ASuW missiles.

If enemy forces have equivalent launch ranges for ASUW weapons, then prudent commanders will dispatch a Surface Action Group (SAG) instead of endangering their HVU. SAGs are good for taking the battle to the enemy. As a rule, they can transit faster than the entire battlegroup and prosecute the attack more quickly. The commander must ensure, however, that SAG composition is adequate both to accomplish the mission and to defend itself against potential threats.

A strong SAG should be capable of posing a viable threat to a CVBG. To do so, it should include at least four medium range ASuW shooters, one long range AAW shooter, one medium range AAW shooter and, if an ASW threat is present, a couple of helo equipped platforms to counter the subs and provide OTH targeting services. Towed array assets are not important because SAG transit speeds render this sensor useless. This composition ideally means four ships of proper capability, not eight total, because each ship class should be multimission capable. Two- and three-ship SAGs may also be used against smaller groups or less capable ships with a corresponding expectation of success.

The optimum formation for a SAG is a scouting line abreast with 1012nm spacing between units. This allows for maximum swept coverage of the scouted area, covert communications via flaghoist and semaphore relay, as well as optimum separation for passive cross-fixing, as described in the section on Electronic Warfare. Also, when the target group has been located and classified, this formation provides an inherent multiple axis for your ensuing missile attack.

Effective ASuW requires passive cross-fixing and other over-thehorizon targeting techniques. Once forces have been detected, classified, and targeted, the commander must conduct a detailed estimate of the salvo size required to achieve saturation. Finally, in the prosecution of the attack, make every effort to conceal the origin of the attack to avoid counterattack.