“In war every problem, and every principle, is a duality. Like a coin, it has two faces. This is the inevitable consequence of the fact that war is a two party affair, so imposing the need that while hitting, one must guard.”

-B.H. Liddell Hart

War is not a set piece affair, in which contestants walk politely within striking distance of one another and then exchange blows according to a set of pre-ordained rules. War is a dynamic process without hard and fast rules to guide the combatants. Analysts tend to use maxims or principles in the discussion of warfare, but their usefulness lies not in being constants, as Mr. Liddell Hart so aptly pointed out, but rather in being malleable sources of inspiration that an enlightened commander can apply at a decisive point in the engagement.

All tactical thought, from Sun Tzu to the modern day, contains contradictory elements if viewed exclusively from an academic standpoint. To practitioners of the art of war, however, the dichotomy is easily held, because they understand that each part of the contradiction is equally true at different points in time. As such, it is more important to understand battlefield dynamics than to memorize lists of tactical axioms. Without knowledge of the former, it is impossible to know when the application of any of the latter is relevant.

Although many of the comparisons between ground and naval warfare tend to oversimplify the peculiarities of each to reach a common ground, the basic tactical precepts of fire & movement are equally important in each arena. The objective of the tactical commander is the delivery of firepower in support of the mission. Maneuver is the method that allows the commander to attain position to deliver that firepower. Mobility is also significant to naval forces as an enhancement to survivability. Forces may strike decisively on a given day, avoid counter-detection, and mass for another strike hundreds of miles away the next day.

The ability to mass decisive firepower and move it quickly through the theater of operations is irrelevant if one cannot find a target to employ it on. Excluding land-based assets, which are all considered pre-targeted anyway, enemy forces enjoy the same degree of safety through mobility as your own forces do. As such, he who finds the enemy first while avoiding detection generally wins. Thus, from the initial stages of planning to post-mission egress, the primary focus of the commander must be on scouting.

Once located, the threat posed by an enemy force is diminished severely, and not only because they have lost the element of surprise. If sufficient force exists, the commander may mass it against the threat to eliminate it. If you have limited resources against a superior threat, then avoidance of the threat becomes the best option. If you know the enemy’s whereabouts, and they remain uncertain of yours, then avoidance is not difficult to achieve. In that latter example is a fundamental truth that must be internalized. Scouting and intelligence gathering are not one-sided propositions. As the commander attempts to gather targeting data on the enemy, it is also necessary to make every effort to deny him the same luxury. The approaches one considers in this struggle depend on the geography of the area of operations, his assessment of enemy capabilities, and the specifics of the mission.

The Naval Officer assesses the impact of geography on the area of operations a little differently than his counterparts in the other services. Conventional topography is important in two instances: first, when one will send airstrikes ashore and seeks to use this topography to advantage in planning ingress and egress routes of the strike elements and, second, when one is forced to operate close to the shore and the topography delays detection of outbound enemy airstrikes. Bottom topography is critical if the enemy possesses either a mine or subsurface threat or if your own force will employ these assets. Finally, other continental features are important whenever they compress the battle space afforded the commander.

To explain, battle space is a theoretical bubble around a force in which the commander feels comfortable in detecting, tracking, and engaging threats before they can pose a significant danger to the main body. Whenever units are forced to operate in confined waters (e.g. the Tsugaro Straights off Japan or the Persian Gulf), the battle space has been compressed. Because the units are limited in the option of maneuver, the enemy can establish effective barrier patrols or minefields more easily. Also, the commander is constrained by physical borders, such as reefs or shallows, or legal borders like the 12 mile limit, in the positioning of pickets and screening units, which further reduces the reaction time allotted any threat which does materialize.

The significance afforded geographic features also varies based on the enemy’s capability to capitalize on any of these areas. If, for example, one faced an adversary without a known subsurface or mine threat, then the only precautions necessary to sanitize a chokepoint prior to passage might be a surface or air sweep to identify and eliminate surface threats. Conversely, the possible presence of even an antiquated diesel boat in narrow, shallow waters is too deadly a contingency to be ignored. As such, the prudent commander must study the enemy order of battle and understand their capabilities. As one can never know enemy intentions with any acceptable degree of certainty, contingency planning must always remain focused on capabilities, no matter how remote their realization may seem. This does not mean that the commander never enters the straits on the premise that a diesel boat might be lurking, as such timidity is tantamount to failure, but rather means that all prudent precautions are taken before risking the critical asset.

Having invested considerable thought into the geographic anomalies of the area and the capabilities of the enemy order of battle (OOB), it is now time to plan intended movement. Keeping in mind that maneuver is the achievement of scouting and firing position over time, one must consider any time constraints imposed by the original mission on the ultimate objectives. Do the critical high value units of the force have sufficient time to make a leisurely, cautious approach to the objective, or is it necessary to serve political expediency and rush to the fore? The answer to that question determines the degree of planning flexibility afforded the commander in determining the eventual timeline of engagement. Further, the timeline has a direct impact on tactics.

The geographic and navigational models of Harpoon II allow unprecedented realism in performing these stages of mission planning. Players who are willing to invest the planning time to consider the specific geography of the area of operations will be rewarded with commensurate improvements in their tactical success rate. Consider the satisfaction of the commander who correctly anticipates the presence of enemy forces and develops a contingency plan to eliminate that threat compared to one who destroys them only after their weapons are expended. In the latter case, even if the enemy units inflict minimal damage, they have achieved a degree of mission success by attriting the commander's defensive weapons magazines, which could prove crucial in subsequent engagements.

Once mission objectives are known, and the commander has identified the high value units necessary to achieve those objectives, the next step is to plot the Path of Intended Motion (PIM) to achieve position and deliver the force necessary to complete the mission. In determining the PIM, it is critical that commanders consider the specific geography of the operational area and evaluate the enemy’s ability to use that geography to advantage.

If you have developed a flawless plan, which the enemy resolutely cooperates with, then the topic of this section is moot. You will already be engaging the enemy in the order desired. The frequency of this occurrence, however, is too infinitesimal to be measured. As stated previously, war is a dynamic process. As such, you must be capable of altering the existing battle plan on the fly and redefining the order of engagement instantaneously. To do so, you must evaluate the threat of each new contact in terms of potency and immediacy.

Potent threats are those forces which, if left unchecked, are capable of precluding mission accomplishment. Naturally, there are varying degrees of potency within this grouping. Some units may be eminently capable of executing the threat, others only noteworthy on a good day with a lot of luck. Either way, it is the commander's task to examine every new contact against the enemy OOB and assess the degree of threat it offers to friendly forces. Immediate threats may or may not be capable of precluding mission accomplishment, but they do pose a clear and immediate danger to friendly forces, usually stemming from the fact that they have already attained weapons launch positions.

Remembering that the commander has already been cautioned to know the enemy, platform specific guidance as to the level of threat will not be presented here. Indeed, the number of variables inherent in such an analysis would require volumes for all the ships, aircraft and submarines depicted in Harpoon ll. Instead, the player should employ their knowledge of sensor and weapons ranges to categorize each contact within the threat class hierarchy depicted in Table 1.



The appearance of a Class “A” threat is occasion to drop everything else and eliminate the interloper. Class “B” threats also require swift action, but one should prosecute them without pulling assets off the main tasking. Class “C” threats should be the naval commander's bread and butter, as they are detected before they have achieved launch positions. This allows for a methodical massing of force over the horizon to destroy them or, if their defenses are too strong, then enough time has been purchased to maneuver to avoid the threat. Class “D” threats are also known collectively as targets of opportunity. Their destruction can aid the overall effort in some way, but it is not essential to success by any stretch of the imagination.

Please note that firepower is not the only criterion for threat classification. An ocean-going tug can be a class “A” threat if it is providing targeting data to one or more shooters somewhere over the horizon. Similar concerns must be exhibited with flag merchants of the hostile nation. Remember to assess enemy capabilities rather than intentions.

Once the PIM is established, the commander must determine the general disposition of the force. Naval warfare differs from its ground counterpart in this respect, because the geographic proximity of unit placement is a function of defensive strength versus offensive strength. Thanks to passive targeting and over-the-horizon missile capability, it is no longer necessary to form a line of battle to concentrate force on the enemy. With proper command and control, widely dispersed units can put their missiles on target within seconds of one another, as evidenced in Operation Desert Storm. These same units, however, are less capable of defending themselves as individuals when compared to their ability to support one another in a well-designed formation with overlapping missile coverage. Given that condition, you would expect the use of supporting defensive formations to serve inferior and superior force equally well. Reality does not bear this out, however, and the use of defensive formations is actually more critical for the superior force. Consider the rationale that supports this conclusion by examining the following hypothetical conflict between big water navy Blue and coastal nation Orange.

Blue sacrifices superiority if their forces are divided such that they might be engaged piecemeal. Yet, by massing the forces to support one another defensively, Blue simplifies Orange’s targeting once the force is located. Orange is better off to disperse their units in the face of Blues superiority. Why? This dispersal forces Blue to detect, classify, and engage each individual element of the Orange force, which precludes simultaneous action against all of them. While the first elements are being engaged, Orange is buying time to get his other units into position to conduct a coordinated offensive strike against the Blue Force.

By adding names to the faces, astute players will note that the classic example of the aforementioned discussion is the war that never was. U.S. wargames focused on how they would use CV Task Forces to project power on the Soviet mainland, while their Soviet counterparts built their bastion concept around the very approach illustrated for the inferior player. The lesson to learn and apply in all mission planning, regardless of the nationalities involved, is that unit concentration universally favors the superior side and dispersal is the tactic of choice when outnumbered or outgunned.

The threat axis is the commander's estimate of the likely direction from which an attack can emanate. The threat axis always exists, whether it applies to a single unit or a group of units, but it is really most significant in formation planning for groups. Although this sounds simple to understand, there are nuances to the establishment and operational use of a threat axis that must be clarified from the outset to alleviate later confusion.

First, a threat axis is always stated in true bearing, as opposed to relative bearing. This means that a threat axis of 000 degrees is due North, regardless of the compass course the formation is steering. Second, a threat axis may be defined as a single bearing, an arc of bearing (090-120 degrees, for example) or it may be designated as 360 degrees. In the last case, it means that the force is operating far enough within the engagement envelope of the enemy that the strike could come from any sector. Also, formations may have a single threat axis defined, or separate ones for each warfare area, such as the Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) axis, the Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) axis, etc. This latter case occurs infrequently, as it can lead to confusion within the formation, but the omniscient role of the player in Harpoon II allows mixed formation dispositions, if desired, without fear of complications. Finally, the location of the threat axis changes over time as the force moves along the PIM.


Figure 1: Threat Axis from Carrier Battle Group to Threat Aircraft.


Figure 2: Threat Axis changes as Carrier Battle Group transits the Mediterranean Sea.

The major factors in determining station assignments in a formation, other than the location of the threat axis, are the capabilities of the platforms themselves. Although virtually all modern ship designs emphasize multi-mission capability (i.e.: the ability to conduct AAW, ASW, and Anti-Surface Warfare - ASuW), the reality is that each class has a specialty within the three warfare areas and some limited ability to conduct the other missions. Commanders must analyze their force mix and categorize ships accordingly before proceeding deeper into stationing considerations. Because of the aforementioned emphasis on the defensive nature of formations, and the knowledge that ASuW is primarily offensive in nature, this categorization should focus on AAW and ASW abilities.

A formation is a method of layered defense. Picket ships, Combat Air Patrol (CAP), and airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft provide surveillance to 200 nm and beyond. The outer screen typically occupies sectors between 12 and 24 nm from the main body. The inner screen is stationed within visual contact of the High-Value Units (HVU), usually under 10 nm from the formation center.

Since the employment of detached action groups, such as surface action groups and surface action units or picket ships, are specialized tactics, the placement of these assets will be excluded from this discussion. The circumstances for their use, as well as the proper stationing in relation to the threat axis, will be addressed in the appropriate warfare section of this manual. At this stage, it is important for the commander to focus exclusively on the functions of the inner and outer screens. Standard placement of the high value unit(s) in the center of the screen is assumed.

The function of the outer screen is to detect and engage any units that have leaked through the pickets and threaten the main body. To accomplish this mission, the outer screen must be capable of performing in all the mission areas. ASuW is a given, so the composition of the outer screen should be equally capable in the other mission areas, skewing any advantage toward ASW. Also, the ASW platforms chosen for the outer screen should have the best passive detection suites and the capability for stand off engagement of contacts with helicopter assets.

ASW assets are more effective in the outer screen because their separation from the ambient noise generated by the main body is critical to passive detection of submarines. Also, because the sizes of the sectors in the outer screen are so much larger, ASW assets can sprint to the forward corner of their area and drift at bare steerage back through the sector. Their vulnerability is increased while sprinting, but they are extremely effective on the return leg. A ship like a Spruance with a towed array sonar, operating at five knots or less, is virtually undetectable to submarines. AAW assets are present in the outer screen for two reasons: to provide covering fire for the relatively vulnerable ASW platforms and to engage short range ASuW missile equipped aircraft before they reach their launch points against main body assets. In evaluating platforms for this role, maximum effective range of the SAM battery is more important than salvo rate. Aircraft are slower than missiles, and by employing greater range missiles, the outer screen AAW asset can conduct more engagements within the fixed amount of battle space. The more engagements, the greater chance the strike will jettison ordnance and go home.

ASW units selected for the inner screen should have the best active sonar suites, to allow for delousing (combing the area beneath the HVU) and an immediate targeting solution on any contacts that have penetrated the outer screen. Helicopter capability is important, but only if two or more inner screen assets are helo capable. This restriction is due again to the need for immediate and decisive action, which negates the effectiveness of a helicopter asset chocked and chained to the deck. With one helo always in the air in an ASW configuration, the commander can use it to “pounce” on any contacts generated by the inner screen.

The emphasis for assignment of AAW assets to the inner screen should be rate of fire, rather than range. It is assumed that any air contacts penetrating to the inner screen will be missiles. As such, they will be traveling faster than the platforms that launched them and there will be more of them as well, as each aircraft generally launches more than one missile. The more defensive firepower you can put in the air, the more inbound missiles will be attrited, and the smaller the burden of point defense systems like Phalanx becomes.

Aegis is the premier AAW suite for inner screen defense because of its all-aspect engagement ability and lack of launcher limitation for vertical launch equipped systems (VLS). Because of this fact, no modern U.S. CVBG puts to sea without a VLS cruiser tethered ona 4,000-yard leash to the carrier. Cruiser skippers who were used to the relative independence of picket duty prickle at the current situation, but it is a reality of modern tactical doctrine.

Any serious student of military history will point out countless examples of how technological improvements have driven changes in tactics. Throughout it all, however, the commander's prime objective of delivering firepower in support of the mission has remained unchanged. Further, in order to accomplish this objective, the commander must still locate the enemy, track him, and target him. The effort to do so involves all methods of surveillance, from visual sighting to electronic intercept of emissions, and it is known collectively as scouting. Scouting involves gathering data, active and passive, from all friendly forces for use by the tactical commander. The degree of effectiveness of scouting is a function of the area covered per unit of time. Command & Control functions, for the purpose of this discussion, are those which allow the commander to correlate scouting information on enemy force strength and disposition and disseminate that information to his own forces for exploitation in a battle plan.

As technological improvements have driven the envelope of engagement from the visual horizon out to 600nm, the scouting problem has been complicated exponentially. Why? Simply because of the increased area that must be covered for the commander to feel safe that any units within striking distance have been discovered. Also, because of the increasing lethality of weaponry, the Battle of the First Salvo is a realistic consideration. The commander who finds the enemy first and gets off an effective attack, while precluding the opponent from doing the same, will ultimately succeed. As such, the electronic battlefield, once referred to as the battle of the airwaves, holds the key to victory.

Electronic Warfare (EW) is actually composed of three distinct subsets: Electronic Support Measures (ESM), Electronic CounterMeasures (ECM) and Electronic Counter-CounterMeasures (ECCM). All legs of the triad are modeled in Harpoon Il, but the commander will have varying degrees of control over each portion. ESM will afford the greatest degree of user specified doctrine, while ECM offers a lesser degree of selectability, and ECCM efforts are modeled almost exclusively within the algorithms which control combat resolution. It is assumed that forces will employ all ECCM Capabilities they possess, so the results of these efforts will be displayed automatically without user intervention.

ESM involves the passive reception of enemy electromagnetic emissions. By processing these emissions against a database of known emissions, and comparing the frequency, pulse repetition rate and other details too extensive to cover here, modern ESM suites like the SLQ-32 are capable of identifying the class of emitter which produced the transmissions. Some emitters are unique to a single class of ship, aircraft, or submarine; as soon as that emitter is detected, the commander will be able to classify the threat exactly. Most emitters, however, are carried on numerous platforms. As such, a single emission may only produce a list of possibilities as to the originating platform. When this occurs, prudent commanders must assume the worst possible case of all the potential threats.

Subsequent emissions of other radar types from the same bearing may allow one to narrow the list of possible threats, by excluding those platforms which do not have both emitter types, but formations of many vessels may still make this evaluation unreliable. Indeed, it is possible for far-sighted commanders to radiate emitters on two separate ships in proximity, possibly leading the enemy to believe a third, stronger vessel is present.

A unit which radiates, and is subsequently classified by the enemy, is not necessarily targeted or even located with any degree of certainty. If a single unit in the force receives the transmission, a line of bearing to the source is generated. If multiple units in the force receive the intercept, they may correlate their bearings to define an ellipse known as the area of probability, within which the radiating unit must be. This technique is known as passive cross-fixing. See Figure 3. The greater the physical separation between the units coordinating for the passive cross fix, the greater their bearing separation will be and the more accurate and narrow the area of probability.

One thing should be readily apparent already: For ESM efforts to be effective, the enemy must cooperate by radiating their emitters. Given the potentially deadly effect of a passive, over-the-horizon missile attack, in which the first warning is illumination by missile seeker heads in their terminal phase of flight, one might reasonably question if it is ever worthwhile to radiate and risk this possibility. The answer is yes, but radiating must be done when it is tactically advisable to do so and avoided when it is not. As the battlefield is a dynamic environment, the situations which dictate changes in emission posture are also fluid. As such, a thorough understanding of subsequent material in this section is essential to success in Harpoon Il.

Figure 3: The effect of geographic separation on generating ESM cross-fixes.
Note that the widely separated ships are much more effective.

The manner in which commanders determine who may radiate, and under what circumstances, is known as the EMCON (EMissions CONtrol) posture. The tactical commander, even in periods of unrestricted emissions, must consider the impact of that decision in terms of the targeting data provided any potential adversary. In the U.S. Navy, EMCON posture is typically generalized in operations orders as follows:



It is important to understand, however, that different components of a force may be in different EMCON conditions. Consider a CVBG, for example, that desires to remain untargeted but wants a good surface picture out to 250nm. The task force commander may opt to keep the surface units of the task force in EMCON Alpha, while launching an E-2C to conduct an active surface search. If the E-2C is detected by enemy forces, its presence will denote that a carrier is somewhere within the area of operations, but the enemy will be denied specific targeting data on the location of the carrier as long as the E-2 is not radiating on the deck or in close proximity to its parent.

This example brings up the common problems with the quality of information obtained through ESM. The quality of an ESM fix is directly related to the separation of the detecting units, as denoted in earlier in Figure 3, and the duration of the enemy emissions. The longer the enemy complies by radiating, the higher quality fix one may obtain. In general, the following classifications are applied to ESM fixes:



Commanders must realize that the enemy seeks to target them in the same fashion. As a result, determination of an active or passive posture falls to other considerations.

Consider the earlier example of an inferior vs. a superior force. In that discussion, we determined that a superior naval force should mass to provide mutual defensive support, while an inferior force should disperse, both to divide the offensive capability of the opponent and to increase survivability of the remaining assets until they reach firing positions. Examining that model in terms of EMCON posture might lead one to conclude that logic would lead the superior force to radiate without restriction and the inferior force to favor stealth and surprise.

Taking the place of the superior force commander, hereafter referred to as Orange, your defenses are massed, but they are only effective if any incoming enemy raid is detected. This would mean that the defensive posture adopted by a close formation is only effective if one surrenders the initiative to the enemy by radiating without restriction. If one elects to do so, then the dispersed adversary, which we will call Blue, has a geographical separation which makes passive cross fixing very effective, and he may conduct a coordinated first strike, which could prove decisive. Conversely, if Blue is denied targeting data because Orange remains in a strict EMCON Alpha configuration, he may be forced to conduct an active search, which could lead to defeat in detail of his dispersed assets by Orange’s massing of force.

Herein lies the tactical dilemma faced by all naval commanders. The struggle to obtain a targeting solution must be weighed against the enemy’s ability to do the same. The answer lies in your estimate of whether or not he has already been detected. As the superior force commander, if you have reason to believe that you are undetected and, more importantly, untargeted by the enemy, then you should continue to pursue offensive operations against them without hesitation. If, however, you are reasonably certain that your position is known, a shift to active emissions is necessary to increase survivability.

Electronic Counter Measures involve all techniques designed to deny the enemy specific targeting data. Some of these techniques are actually mechanical, such as Chaff and Soids, but they are classified within this subset of warfare nonetheless. ECM can be both offensive and defensive, and the fluent tactical commander must understand the role of each.

Chaff cannisters contain thousands of thin metal strips which are exploded into a cloud after deployment from the firing ship. These strips fall slowly to the ocean, drifting with the wind and expanding as they do to provide a large, reflective radar signature to active missile seeker heads. Chaff may be employed as either a deceptive or seductive countermeasure. To act as a deception, it must be deployed prior to the launch of the inbound missile group, so that more targets appear than actually exist. (See Figure 4.) Once missiles have been launched, however, chaff clouds only exist to seduce missile seeker heads away from their eventual target. (See Figure 5) Soids, which are floating flares, are only effective in the terminal phase of missiles with infrared signature seeker heads. In Harpoon Il, the employment of Chaff and Soids are automatic functions which reduce the effectiveness of inbound missile groups.


Figure 4: Deceptive Chaff - One ship surrounded by chaff clouds,
which the enemy sensors detect as multiple ships.


Figure 5: Seductive Chaff - The ship has been locked on to by the missile seeker head,
so it fires a seductive chaff cloud, which draws the missile away.

Offensive ECM involves the use of jamming in support of strike operations to preclude the enemy from determining the composition of the strike and targeting specific elements with counter-battery fire. In Harpoon Il, the player will note that inbound air strikes escorted by ECM-capable assets appear only as electronic noise on their tactical displays. This denies targeting of the missile-equipped strike aircraft until the jamming platform is destroyed. Further, a savvy tactical opponent will strike from several directions, complicating the AAW effort with jamming decoy groups and chaff corridors. The Harpoon Il commander will also be able to employ ECM in strike planning.

Defensive ECM includes the employment of Blip Enhancement, Chaff, Soids, and jamming of terminal homers. Blip enhancement is a selectable tactic employed by properly equipped helicopters to produce a radar signature equivalent to an aircraft carrier for missile terminal seeker heads. Similarly, Chaff and Soids are employed to provide larger, more attractive targets to missile seekers than their real world counterparts. Eliminating a missile through any of these countermeasures is termed a “soft kill”, as opposed to a “hard kill” in the form of a traditional intercept.

Electronic Counter-Counter Measures involve manipulative techniques designed to seduce a missile seeker head that has locked-on away from its intended target and toward an imaginary target at another point in space. The use of this and most other defensive ECM functions are handled internally in the Harpoon Il tactical model.

Communications transmissions are also electromagnetic emissions subject to detection and exploitation by the enemy. Again, however, some types of transmissions are more detectable than others. Data links, which are used extensively by U.S. Forces, are line of sight transmissions that are virtually undetectable unless an enemy unit is between the transmitting and receiving units. In Harpoon Il, data links are modeled as connecting webs of lines between the units in contact. Only one unit, such as the E-2C used in the earlier example, may be radiating and therefore targetable by the enemy, but all units connected to the web are capable of using the targeting data provided by the link for any subsequent attack.

Satellite communications, because they are also directional in nature, are difficult to intercept. Traditional radio frequencies, such as UHF, VHF and HF are progressively more susceptible to intercept, and HF transmissions have been localized from thousands of miles away. As a result, the prudent commander must balance the need to disseminate targeting data to his forces with the corresponding intelligence he reveals to the enemy in his method of doing so.