Much has been written about the act of August 23, 1944 in Romania, but some truths of this act and its implications, mostly bad for Romania, have been hidden, with enough skill, from the Romanian people. The military situation of Romania was deliberately overlooked in the spring and summer of 1944, nothing was said to the Romanian people about the great betrayal in Iaşi, on August 20, 1944, of the commander of the 4th Army, General of the Army Corps Mihai Racoviță , committed in close connection with the Royal House and the Communist Party; the military situation of Romania before August 23, 1944, as well as the diplomatic negotiations of the Antonescu government in Cairo and Stockholm, initiated since the end of 1943, were presented in a distorted way, as well as about their results. Not a word was blown about the maneuvers of the palace circles to sabotage these negotiations, and nothing was said about the conspiracy of the Royal House and the P.C.R. for the arrest of Ion Antonescu and his government.

Emil Bodnăraş, traitor-deserter of the Romanian army, conspires at the Royal Palace to open the Romanian front through a military betrayal, called "Poarta Iaşului."
The year 1942 brought important changes in the situation on the front. The strategic initiative passed from Germany to the Allied powers:
- between October 23 and November 3, 1942, the German army in North Africa was defeated in the battle of El Alemain;
- Between January 12 and 18, 1943, the Soviet armies broke through the blockade of Leningrad, and on February 2, the same year, the German-Romanian armies surrendered at Stalingrad. These defeats gave Marshal Antonescu certainty that Germany had lost the war. As early as November 1942, on the train that brought him to Bucharest from a meeting with Hitler, Antonescu made a sensational statement: "Germany has lost the war, we must now focus on not losing ours." Antonescu's efforts confirmed this concern and preoccupation.

As early as February 1943, Marshal Antonescu proposed to Mussolini a common way out of the war, and in September 1943 secret negotiations began for an armistice with the Anglo-Americans. In October of the same year, armistice attempts were made with the British in Lisbon. The Sovereign Pontiff was also approached for this purpose. After meeting with the Allied secret services in Cairo, it was decided to send Colonel De Chastelain's mission to Romania, along with two other officers, to work as intermediaries between the Allies and Bucharest. He was paradropped and installed in Bucharest, in an apartment on the top floor of the Gendarmerie. After the paradrop of Colonel De Chastelain in Romania, Prince Barbu Știrbei was secretly sent to Cairo, under the name of Bond, with a passport given by Antonescu, but in Istanbul he was exposed to the Germans by the British, who wanted to prevent Romania from leaving the Axis. Churchill was betting that the Germans and Romanians would delay the Russians advance towards Europe, and an Anglo-American landing in Constanța could have cut off the Russians journey to Europe. The plan was not accepted by US President Roosevelt.

A problem raised by the Romanian side in the Cairo negotiations and rejected by the Anglo-Americans was the problem of Northern Transylvania, abducted by Hungary through the Vienna Diktat. The Anglo-Americans have said that the issue will be the subject of negotiations at the Peace Conference after the end of the war. As the Romanian side had no guarantee that the Anglo-Americans would return this territory, it rejected the proposal. The Russians, too, pursued their interests quite skillfully. As early as October 1943, at the Conference of Foreign Ministers in Moscow and then at the Tehran Conference of Heads of State of the U.S.S.R., U.S.A. and Great Britain, Molotov, the U.S.S.R. foreign minister, said that "The only man who can make such a change of front in Romania is Marshal Antonescu." In mid-September 1943, Mihai Antonescu informed Dulles that “Romania's participation in the war is only symbolic. To break with this symbol means to expose Romania to the worst reprisals. This is only possible in the case of an Allied landing.'' On this occasion, he insisted on the inopportuneness of changing the Antonescu regime, which had 45 golden wagons, large quantities of grain and a million armed soldiers. "Only the government of today can deny the Germans these precious reserves. On the day when the Marshal would disappear, the Germans would take everything for their needs, and put political servants in the government who would suppress all Antonescu's followers and all the resistance, that is the entire Romanian elite.'' Mihai Antonescu's fears came true, the gold and grain reserves were not taken by the Germans, but by the Russians, and the million soldiers, due to the plot of the Royal Palace and the group of conspirators - Bodnăraş, Dămăceanu, Aldea, Racoviţă - it was disarmed. About 175,000 of Romanian soldiers went to Soviet camps, and the "Iaşi Gate" was opened without fighting to Soviet troops.

In the armistice negotiations in Cairo, it became clear that there were serious differences of opinion between the US State Department, military representatives and US President Roosevelt. The State Department, through its secretary, Cordell Hull, supported by the military representatives, welcomed the Romanian proposals for an armistice: ''The Antonescu government will do it. But, for a change of front, we recognize that if he, Marshal Antonescu, wants and is determined to do so, only he has the necessary means and the greatest chances of success. The American authorities considered Romania's action of exceptional importance. Romania must have the status of co-belligerent and must act as soon as possible.'' But Roosevelt remained steadfast for the unconditional surrender of Romania.
There are many questions that could be asked now, many years after the event.

How could this extraordinary military advantage, the considerable shortening of the war, by at least a year and even its winning then be lost? Why was the supreme head of the army arrested who could obtain the change of front and grant Romania the status of co-belligerent? And especially, how could King Mihai order the disarmament of the army and the ceasefire before the signing of any armistice document? The Romanian opposition - Maniu and Brătianu - collaborated closely with Antonescu in all the armistice negotiations in order to get Romania out of the war together with the Axis, they were regularly informed and consulted with each other. Moreover, Marshal Antonescu even proposed to relinquish power if the allies preferred to negotiate with the Romanian opposition. The Soviet government responded, through Councilor Semionov, categorically to the talks between the power and the opposition: "We, the Russians, prefer to negotiate with the current Romanian government and we are ready to help it liberate the country from the Germans". And in Cairo, the russian ambassador Novikov, like the other two allies, said categorically that he prefers negotiations with Marshal Antonescu and not with the King's envoys.

Because the Cairo negotiations were dragging on, because of the rigid position of the U.S.A. (which required unconditional surrender), as well as because of treaties previously concluded with the U.S.S.R. for the creation of areas of Soviet influence in the Balkans, including Romania, the Antonescu government began armistice negotiations in Stockholm with the Soviet government, through its ambassador, Mrs. Alexandra Kolontay, in December 1943. In order to ensure the success of this action, the Antonescu government made a series of diplomatic changes in the capitals likely to provide opportunities for contacts and negotiations. Thus, Cretzeanu is appointed in Ankara, George Caranfil in Helsinki and Friedrich Nanu in Stockholm, as plenipotentiary ministers. In Stockholm, F. Nanu was contacted by the Russians for armistice negotiations. The contact, discussions and negotiations in the Swedish capital materialized through the formulation of precise conditions of armistice and not of unconditional surrender - as Roosevelt had requested in Cairo. On the issue of Northern Transylvania, the U.S.S.R. considered the Vienna Dictate null and void, and Transylvania was to return entirely to Romania. In its final form, the draft armistice with the U.S.S.R., from Stockholm, contained (among others) the following conditions:
- The Romanian troops on the front will either surrender to the Russians or they will attack the German troops. The Russians undertook to supply them with weapons and other necessary materials and to remain at the disposal of Antonescu and Maniu in order to restore Romania's independence and sovereignty;
- The Russians agreed for Romania to give a 15-day ultimatum to Germany, to leave Romanian territory, before declaring war on it. In the case of the withdrawal of German troops, Romania could remain neutral;
- The Vienna arbitration was null and void. Transylvania was to return to its motherland altogether;
- The Russians were satisfied only with a passageway in the north of the country, and the Romanian government could exercise its functions in a part of the country, the one not occupied by the Soviet armies.
The conditions of the armistice negotiated in Stockholm with the Russians, although more advantageous for Romania, than those in Cairo, involved the recognition of the annexation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina by U.S.S.R.

In parallel with the armistice negotiations in Stockholm and Cairo and with the entanglement of the royal plot, regarding the armistice negotiations in Stockholm, through the king's envoys, negotiations were being held by the Communist Party - to get Romania out of the anti-Soviet war. No matter how much it is denied or underestimated today, P.C.R. played an important role in the plot at the Royal Palace and in the betrayal in Iaşi, but also in the subsequent development of the events launched on August 23, 1944. After the paradrop of Emil Bodnăraş in Romania, in the spring of 1944, there were frequent meetings between Palace circles and P.C.R delegates. Prince Ştirbei even hosted Emil Bodnăraş. On the night of June 13-14, 1944, a last conspiratorial meeting of the P.C.R representatives, Emil Bodnăraş and Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu, took place with the representatives of the Royal Palace and the army: generals Constantin Sănătescu, Aurel Aldea and Gheorghe Mihail, colonel Dumitru Dămăceanu, Ioan Mocsony Stârcea, Mircea Ioaniţiu and Grigore Niculescu Buzeşti, cipher in the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. On this occasion, Emil Bodnăraş criticized the orientation of the palace circles to reduce the overthrow of Antonescu to a simple coup by a group of people and to avoid a wider participation of the masses in the fight. Emil Bodnăraş finally presented the plan of the Communist Party which provided:
a) the overthrow by force of the ''military-fascist'' dictatorship;
b) the withdrawal of the country from the Hitlerite war;
c) turning weapons against Nazi Germany.
After lively discussions, those present approved the plan developed by P.C.R., a fact that says a lot. On June 15, the next day, the King approved this plan. For the preparation of the armed action, a military committee was created, which included the General Gheorghe Mihail, General C. Vasiliu Răşcanu and Colonel Dumitru Dămăceanu.

The king opposed the government-negotiated armistice with the Russians. His position on the armistice clearly results from a statement made to Gheorghe Brătianu: "If we let Antonescu do the armistice alone, he will keep us under the slipper." On this occasion, he advised Brătianu to withdraw from any action with Antonescu. Gheorghe Duca, the king's envoy to Stockholm, also acted in this spirit, and, at the age of 80, he made a title of "glory" out of the king's mission to sabotage the Romanian-Soviet armistice negotiations.

A problem, ignored until now by historians, concerns the opening of the front in Iaşi, on August 20, 1944. After the participants left the meeting with the communists, on June 13 and 14, 1944, they remained inside for a "routine meeting." Emil Bodnăraş and Dumitru Dămăceanu, who secretly established that, in order to remove Antonescu and to hasten Romania's exit from the war, a front segment from Iaşi, conspiratorially called "Poarta Iaşiului" to be opened from a military point of view at a certain date. This front segment, in case of retreat, came on the line of fortifications Focşani-Nămoloasa-Galaţi. The established front segment had a width of 25 km between Erbiceni and Rediu Mitropoliei, north of Iaşi, belonging to the 5th Romanian Army Corps, from the 4th Army, Commander General Nicolescu Constantin, and the Soviet Union to be announced. In addition to those established to be part of the military committee, General Aldea, Marshal of the Palace and General Mihai Racoviţă, commander of the 4th Army on the Moldovan front, with Command Point at Piatra Neamț, were also co-opted into conspiracy. Regarding the situation of the Moldovan front, the following clarification must be made: On the Eastern Front, starting with 1944, the Romanian Army was assigned to the German Army Group "Southern Ukraine" Commander-in-Chief Colonel-General Johannes Frießner. After the great confrontation between German and Soviet tanks at Uman (March 5, 1944), in the middle of the Bug River, lost by the German army, the way was opened for the Soviet armies that reached the northeastern border of Romania, on the Dniester. Gradually, through extensive retreats, the Romanian front, strengthened with German troops, stabilized on April 17, 1944, on the eastern line of the Carpathians, on the river Siret, to Paşcani, then north of Târgul Frumos, north of Iaşi, crossing the Prut. it reached the Dniester, south of Dubăsari, then the Dniester, the Dniester estuary, the Black Sea. The 4th Romanian Army, Commander-in-Chief of the Army Corps, Mihai Racoviţă, defended himself on the eastern line of the Carpathians, on the Siret River and as far south to Dubăsari, on the Dniester. The 4th Romanian Army was composed of the 1st, 5th, 6th, 7th Army Corps and the 57th German Army Corps. Together with the 8th German Army he was part of the "General Wöhler" Army Group.

On the right flank, on the Dniester, the 3rd Romanian Army was defended with the 2nd and 3rd Romanian Army Corps, the 29th and 72nd German Army Corps and the 110th Command. Together with the 6th German Army they formed the Army Group „General Dumitrescu.” On this alignment, Romanian-German troops repulsed numerous Soviet attacks, including the May and June 1944 offensives of Soviet troops. At the beginning of July 1944, a secret visit to Iaşi by General Aurel Aldea, in order to meet with General Racoviţă, occasioned the elaboration of a strategic plan, in the sense envisaged by Bodnăraş-Dămăceanu, for the opening of the front through "Poarta Iaşului." At the end of July 1944, Bodnăraş provided Stalin with all the necessary details: the scheduled opening of the front; opening area; scheduled date - August 20. To materialize the plan, Stalin ordered a slowdown in the Soviet offensive on the Polish front and the transfer of troops to the Moldovan front in the established sector. The Soviet offensive began on the morning of August 20, and the Romanian troops from "Poarta Iaşiului" withdrew during the night. At 13:00, Soviet troops entered Iaşi, overtaking the troops of the 4th Army, which was in disorderly retreat. Marshal Antonescu made a brief inspection visit to the front, between August 20-21, 1944, and found the disorganization of the front and the beginning of the desperate retreat, but he quickly returned to Bucharest, more determined than ever to sign the armistice with the Russians.

On the morning of August 23, 1944, Antonescu was waiting for the answer from Stockholm, to sign the armistice with the U.S.S.R. While waiting for the answer, he requested a document from Maniu and Brătianu, in support of the armistice. Meanwhile, the Soviet acceptance of the Romanian armistice proposals arrived at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from Stockholm. The telegram, instead of being handed to Antonescu, Grigore Niculescu Buzeşti, participant in the conspiracy, handed it to the King. In this situation, the King, without talking about the telegram and involved in the conspiracy with the communists, informed Maniu and Brătianu that he would take action and make the armistice himself, being fed up with Antonescu's tutelage. Although Marshal Antonescu did not receive the expected telegram, he still went to the Palace and was arrested there. He did not go alone but with Mihai Antonescu. The king ordered the three aides present in the room to carry out the order given to them. They arrested the dignitaries and locked them in a room until the communists came to take them. The Non-Commissioned Officer Dumitru Bâlă took part in the action too, the one who told Vladimir Roşulescu the deed in detail, being the father of his college and roommate Eugen Bâlă.
That Antonescu was determined to conclude the armistice with the U.S.S.R. it also results from the fact that on the evening of August 22 he summoned the German minister to Bucharest, Clodius, and in the presence of General Pantazi, Minister of War, informed him that Romania had requested an armistice. The Soviet armistice with Romania was a necessity for U.S.S.R. as well. The fortified Romanian-German positions in Moldova, which resisted numerous Soviet attacks (starting April 17, 1944) and on which the troops were on August 20, as well as the existence behind the front, less than 200 km from a strong alignment fortified - the Focşani-Nămoloasa-Galaţi line - presented the danger of transforming Romania into a theater of war. Therefore, all stakeholders in Romania's destiny, including U.S.S.R., whose resistance on the line of fortifications would have affected its interests in the Balkans, considered it necessary to get the country out of the war by concluding an armistice. Through the betrayal from Iaşi, on August 20, 1944, the Romanian-German front in Moldova fell in a flash, and the organization of a resistance on the lines of fortifications was thwarted. On August 23, 1944, at 13:00 the Soviet troops, marching through Moldova, because they met no resistance, were 60 km away from Focșani, and at 18:00 the Soviet vanguards reached the line of fortifications.

At 22:00, on August 23, by the Proclamation of King Mihai, a ceasefire was ordered between Romanian and Soviet troops, but because the armistice with the Soviets was not signed, the Russians continued to capture the Romanian military. This is how about 175,000 Romanian soldiers were taken to Siberia, 40,000 of them were interned in the Bălți camp in Bessarabia, where they died of starvation, cold, disease, or were executed by bessarabian commissars from the Soviet Army, among them being Major Alexandru Bârlădeanu. Critics of the act of August 23, 1944 ( and there are many ) consider it, some as an "act of high treason" and others as a "grave political error." Both are right, it was both an act of high treason and a serious political error with multiple implications and harmful consequences for Romania. They claim, and they are right, that Marshal Antonescu should have been allowed to conclude and sign the armistice, because he had negotiated it and could impose on the Russians, through his powerful army of one million men, another course of action than capitulation. By arresting Antonescu and capitulating the entire army, by order of King Mihai, before signing the armistice with the Russians, Romania lost the legal and moral basis of defending its rights, it dishonored itself. Unconditional surrender meant a national disaster, a great ordeal for Romania, which will take it a long time. Along with the approximately 175,000 Romanian soldiers which were sent to the Soviet prison camps after August 23, 1944, there were also deported to the U.S.S.R. over 20,000 other Romanians and 72,000 Romanian citizens of German ethnicity. By not signing the armistice and unconditional surrender, Romania lost its freedom, being denied the status of co-belligerent country, although it was the fourth military power participating in the defeat of Germany.
Within a decade and a half, after August 23, 1944, Romania was stolen by the Russians for at least 3 billion dollars, instead of the 300 million imposed by the "armistice" dictated by Moscow. The signing of the armistice with the U.S.S.R., which contained many burdensome conditions for Romania, compared to the armistice negotiated with Antonescu, was delayed until September 12, 1944 and the protocol on relations between the Romanian Army and the Soviet Army was signed only on September 25, which made the Romanian Army engage alone in the struggles for the liberation of Transylvania, managing to repel the German-Hungarian troops from the Romanian territory, until the temporarily imposed border in mid-September.

Significant for the prestige that Marshal Antonescu enjoyed in Moscow is also the answer given by Molotov to Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu, on September 12, 1944, present in Moscow with the Romanian delegation for signing the armistice. When Pătrăşcanu asked why the armistice conditions imposed by the U.S.S.R. to Romania are heavier than those offered to Antonescu, Molotov replied: "Antonescu represented Romania, you do not represent anyone." But any betrayal pays dearly, and the price of betrayal came pretty quickly. The first to suffer the consequences were Generals M. Racoviţă and Gh. Mihail. The first had become minister of war and the second Chief of the General Staff, and both had been part of the military committee responsible for implementing the opening of the "Iaşi Gate." Towards the beginning of September 1944, the pressure of the Soviet commands to subordinate the Romanian Army intensified, and starting with September 7, the Romanian Army came under the subordination of the Soviet Army, being divided into different groups of Soviet armies, and the Romanian Navy's crews were landed on September 3 and replaced with Soviet crews. Thus, the duties of the two traitorous generals were seriously damaged. The reward of betrayal continued. After the war, both General Racoviţă and General Aldea were imprisoned; the first at the Sighet prison, where he died in 1954 and the second at the Aiud prison, where he died in 1949. The communist regime probably did not want to know about the betrayal and how it came to power. King Mihai paid the least, in proportion to the contempt he enjoyed for the Russians and the internal communists. Too little is asked why Stalin gave Mihai the Order of Pobeda (Victoria).

Even if the Marshal had succeeded in making the armistice, Antonescu still would not trust the russians. Knowing that the russians would try to take the gold reserves, considered that it would be better to distribute all the gold to the Romanian population so that it would be more difficult for the russians to take it.
In the end, the gold reserves were taken by the russians because of the coup.

Romanian version


English version
March 28, 1944, Fragment from the notes of the British agent Alfred George Gardyne de Chastelain.

Tuesday March 28

The timing for Autonomous's signaling plan wasn't right, so I decided to deliver the message the next day. I was called down by General Vasiliu, who, in the presence of General Tobescu and Eugen Cristescu, told me that the situation on the Russian front had become serious and that the Romanian government was worried about the fate of its gold reserves of 350 tons. Vasiliu informed me that Antonescu was considering the possibility of distributing the gold to the population to ensure the widest possible dispersion and reduce the risk of large quantities falling into the hands of the russians. As an alternative, transportation of the gold to Turkey, in a number of Junkers transport planes, was being considered.

Marshal Ion Antonescu
Since Marshal Ion Antonescu was arrested, he was always kept under observation or even recorded, all these moments were portrayed in a Romanian movie called Oglinda - Începutul adevărului ( The Mirror - The Beginning of Truth ) made by Sergiu Nicolaescu.

The arrest of Marshal Antonescu ( in romanian )

Marshal's last speech

Last meeting with his wife

Last meeting with his mother & execution ( activate the subtitles on youtube )

Medals & Decorations
Antonescu received many medals and decorations throughout his military career, most highest being the Order of Michael the Brave, which was personally awarded to him by King Ferdinand I during the Romanian-Hungarian War of 1919. He also received several medals and decorations from foreign countries, most highest was the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross awarded by Hitler himself, becoming the first foreigner to receive it.



He also received the Order of Aeronautical Virtue of War with Swords, in the classes of Golden Cross with First and Second bar, Knight with First and Second bar, Officer and Commander on December 3, 1941 for courage and example served to all airmen and the entire army. For the activity he carried out, moving all the time by air, for leading and controlling operations on the battlefield.


King Mihai I
King Mihai was victorious, but in the end was on the losing side. His allies betrayed and exiled him, those who were not against the king were sent to prisons where they will die later because of the tortures of the communist regime or old age. Even former communist allies of the king died in those prisons because they were considered too dangerous against the future Stalinization Operations of Romania by the soviets. When King Mihai went to Great Britain in exile, unlike his father, he did not leave empty-handed, but with a few kilograms of gold.

Abdication of the king ( in romanian )

The only medal King Mihai had for military actions was the Order of Pobeda (Victoria), the rest of the medals had because ( like any king ) his uniform should not be empty.

About this subject the Romanians are divided between two sides, one that considers King Mihai did the right thing and one that considers King Mihai betrayed his people.
What these sides have in common is that many don't know exactly what happened during that period, the side in favor of the king knows that Romania declared war on the Axis and the side in favor of Antonescu knows that Romania betrayed an alliance.

The Country
Romania in World War II was the biggest contributor of Operation Barbarossa, sending the most troops and resources ( in special oil and grain ), receiving the most iron crosses as a foreign nation and also being the first foreign nation to receive iron crosses, Mihail Lascăr being the first foreigner to receive Oak Leaves. Romania also paid 150 million reichsmarks in gold to Germany for military equipment (weapons, artillery and others), in 3 years only 15% of the order was delivered, today 1 reichsmark from 1940 is equal to 2,34 euros.





The fate of the old and the new government
While Antonescu's government and its collaborators were sent to death, the new government of the king, believing that they have nothing to worry about, they could never imagine that a total purge would come upon them. The first thing the soviets did was to abdicate the king, then to get rid of all romanian politicians from that time, including the communists who helped the king making the coup. Later the soviets put loyal servants in charge, until Ceaușescu appeared in the government.



The Romanian Army after switching sides
The Romanian soldiers suffered the most, when they thought they had an ally and an enemy on the front, now they had two enemies. And when an enemy became an ally, that ally treated the Romanian soldiers like they were still enemies.
A good example is the story of 4th Infantry Division.


Marshal Ion Antonescu
After what happened, Antonescu did not remain in history of his people like Hitler for the germans. When a Romanian says that he supports Antonescu, he does not refer to crimes or anything like that, but he says that he supports what Antonescu represented during that time, and exactly how Molotov said ''Antonescu represented Romania.''
Something interesting about the Marshal's personality is that it was even liked by Nicolae Ceaușescu who wanted to make a statue in Bucharest in honor of Antonescu, he was asked why he wanted to make the statue and replied ''Maybe he didn't won the world war, but he won the morale one.''



King Mihai I
After the fall of communism, King Mihai came to Romania under the pretext of a visit, when he actually came to take back the wealth confiscated by the communists. After that, he had several interviews, one was about his opinion about Antonescu where he said that he does not deserve to be executed, because he was a patriot who loved his country. Of course this could have been orchestrated to calm down the rival sides. But what is really true is that Antonescu saved Mihai I from exile in 1940, the marshal felt that he had an obligation to the royal family, especially after the event near the Tisa river when he received the medal from King Ferdinand in 1919, probably King Mihai would have been exiled with his father if it wasn't Antonescu Prime Minister and that's also why in that interview maybe felt an obligation to defend Antonescu.


Today both sides honored their heroes with statues, paints, songs etc.

Statues



Paints



Songs