According to the senior surviving officer, Baron Von Mullenheim-Rechberg, Captain Lindemann believed that a formidable ship such as BISMARCK, should be called “he” as befitting it's strength and power. Von Mullenheim-Rechberg acted as Captain Lindemann's aide for a time. He describes Lindemann in great detail in his book Battleship Bismarck"

"Bismarck" - the battleship of the German fleet, one of the most famous ships of the Second World War. Named after Otto von Bismarck, the first chancellor of the German Empire. During its only cruise in May 1941, the British flagship, the battle cruiser HMS Hood, sank in the Danish Strait. After that, the British fleet began to hunt for Bismarck three days later, ending it by sinking.

The Bismarck type (another ship of this type was later built — the Tirpitz battleship) was originally created as the heir to the “pocket battleships” and was intended mainly for carrying out raider operations against merchant ships.Bismarck during his service was the largest battleship in the world.

The German commander of the group of ships, Admiral Gunther Lutyens, was ordered to conduct Operation «Rheinubung» on April 22. On May 5, Hitler himself visited Bismarck, and Lutyens assured him of the complete success of the forthcoming operation in the Atlantic.

The battleship, commanded by Captain 1st Rank Ernst Lindemann and on which the headquarters of Admiral Lutyens was located, left Danzig on the night of May 18-19. The crew of the battleship was informed about the objectives of the operation only at sea. In the area of ​​the Arkona Peninsula from Swinemunde, there was a meeting with the destroyers Friedrich Eckold and Z-23, and the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen (Captain 1st Rank Brinkman) approached from Kiel. They were joined by the Sperrbrecher 13 railroad translator to travel across the Great Belt.

At about 15:00 on May 20, after passing the Big Belt, the compound unexpectedly stumbled upon the Swedish cruiser Gotland. Its commander, Captain 2nd Rank Agren, immediately reported this to Stockholm.

The British naval attaché in Stockholm, Commander H. Denham, was having a routine meeting that day with his Norwegian counterpart, who, among other news, informed him of this. Back at the embassy, ​​Denham, marked "very urgent," sent an encrypted message to the Admiralty. By 3.30 the next day, the operational intelligence center had informed the naval and coastal command.

All these events marked the beginning of a large-scale hunt for the German "pocket battleship" by the British fleet in May 1941.

Having received a message early in the morning on May 21 about the departure of the battleship "Bismarck" and the heavy cruiser "Prince Eugen" from Kattegat, the battle cruiser Hood, Prince of Wales and 6 destroyers: «Electra», «Anthony», «Echo», «Icarus», «Achates» and «Antelope» left Scapa Flow to help "Norfolk" and "Suffolk" patrolling the Danish Strait

On "Norfolk", under the command of 1st-Class Captain Alfred Phillips, 1st Cruiser Squadron Commander Rear Admiral William F. Wake-Walker was flying his flag. Captain 1st Rank Robert M. Ellis stood on the command bridge of Suffolk.

The group, heading for the Danish Strait from the main base of the capital's fleet, was led by Vice Admiral Lancelot E. Holland, carried the flag on "Hood". The ship itself, the pride of the British fleet, was commanded by Captain 1st Rank Ralph Kerr.

«Manchester» (captain Herbert A.Parker) and «Birmingham» (captain Alexander C.G.Madden) were ordered to guard the strait between Iceland and the Faroe Islands.
Scapa Flow have the ship "Victorious" (Captain Henry Bovell), who, accompanied by the Repulse (Captain William G. Tennant), was to sail on May 22 with WS8B convoy to the Middle East. The exit of both ships had to be canceled, they were transferred to the command of the commander-in-chief of the capital's fleet, Admiral Sir John Tovey, who led the operation to capture the German battleship.
From the moment the operation began, the broadcasting right was severely limited - in fact, all British ships observed radio silence.

After receiving a message about the discovery of a German group by coastal aviation in Kor Fjord (on May 21 at 13:15, a reconnaissance officer who made a search flight over Bergen photographed the ships at the anchorage - the deciphering of the image showed that they were "Bismarck" and "Prince Eugen", Admiral J. Tovi sent "Hood" and "Prince of Wales" and 6 destroyers to the Icelandic Hvalfjörður. Under the guise of an air raid on Bergen, the British took several more photographs, confirming their assumptions that the ships were ready to enter the Atlantic.

At 19.00, Admiral G. Lutyens, confident in the disclosure of the operation by the British, interrupting the bunkering, gave the order to leave the fiord. This happened at 19.45 on May 21.

On the next day, the weather worsened: cloudiness over the North Sea dropped to an altitude of 600 m, it was pouring rain in the Danish Strait, visibility did not exceed half a mile.

Under such conditions, aerial reconnaissance seemed useless, but the commander of the Hatston naval station in the Orkney Islands, Captain 2nd Rank Fancourt, nevertheless sent - on his own initiative - one plane across the North Sea. Pilot Lieutenant N.N. Goddard and Observer Commander G.A.Rotherdam reached Bergen, took aerial photographs under heavy anti-aircraft fire, and returned safely to Hatston. No German ships were found in the fiords - information about this was reported to Admiral J. Tovi at 20.00 on May 22.

Meanwhile, German ships, following a 24-knot course, passed Trondheim at about 7.00 on May 22. Earlier, at about 4.00, Admiral G. Lutyens released the escort destroyers to Trondheim, and the unit headed for Jan Mayen, where a meeting with the tanker «Weissenburg» was planned. By 21.00 the German ships reached 68 ° N.

After asking the command about the presence of British forces in Scapa Flow and receiving an answer (based on the data of air reconnaissance, the Germans believed that there were 4 battleship, 1 aircraft carrier, 6 cruisers and 17 destroyers), at 23.20 Admiral G. Lutiens refused to bunkering and turned to W, intending to enter the Atlantic by the Danish Strait.

Admiral J. Tovi, not having accurate data on the whereabouts of "Bismarck" and "Prinz Eugen", proceeded from the assumption that German ships were sent to the Atlantic to destroy merchant ships. Having clarified the orders to his forces - having sent the "Arethusa" to the aid of "Manchester" and "Birmingham" and ordered to organize continuous air patrols in dangerous directions - at 22.45 on 22 May, the Commander-in-Chief of the Metropolitan Fleet left Scapa Flow accompanied by "Victorious", the 2nd cruising squadron and five destroyers. He intended to take a central position. Admiral J. Tovey's flag flew on the halyards of the King George V commanded by Captain 1st Rank Willfrid L. Patterson.

The commander of the 2nd cruising squadron, Rear Admiral A.T. Curteis, raised his flag on the "Galatea" cruise ship commanded by Captain 2nd Rank Edward W.B.Sim. The rest of the cruisers were commanded by Rank 2 Captains William GAgnew - "Aurora", Michael M. Denny - "Kenya", Rory C. O'Conor - "Neptune". The squadron also included "Hermione", commanded by Jeoffrey N. Oliver.

Destroyers: Flagship "Inglefleld" - Rank 2 Captain Percy Todd, Commander of the 3rd Flotilla, "Intrepid" - Rank 3 Captain Roderick C. Gordon, "Nestor" - Rank 3 Captain Konrad Ahlers- Hankey (Conrad B. Alers-Hankey), "Punjabi" - 3rd Rank Captain Stuart A.Buss and "Active" - ​​Lieutenant Commander Michael W. Tomkinson.

"Repulse" joined them in the morning. The entire day of May 23, the formation followed to W. Air reconnaissance was not carried out due to bad weather.

The weather in the Danish Strait was unusual: the air was clear above the pack ice extending up to 80 miles from the coastline and about 10 miles from the ice edge, while the rest of the water and Iceland were shrouded in thick fog. At 7:22 pm, "Suffolk", traveling at 18 knots, detected large surface targets on its radar at 20 ° bearing at 7 miles. Bismarck and Prince Eugen, skirting the pack ice, were 55 miles northwest of North Cape.

Immediately reporting the target by radio, Captain 2nd Rank R. Ellis turned to S-O so as not to be detected himself. At 20.30, Norfolk established radar contact.

"Suffolk" was the first to notice the enemy, the Admiralty received the message from Norfolk - at 21.03 it was transmitted to the Commander of the Home Fleet. "Hood" received the first message from Suffolk at 20.04.
Also, the presence of the "Bismarck" radar detected and classified "Suffolk" at 18.20 (on German ships the time was 1 hour earlier than English) at a distance of 7 miles. Having prepared the data for firing from the main caliber and informing their command about the detection of the English cruiser, after 10 minutes. Battleship was ready to open fire when its radar detected another target at a distance of 6 miles - soon the "Norfolk" at full speed appeared for a moment out of the darkness behind battleship, but immediately retreated.

The radio message about the detected of "Bismarck" went on the air at 20.32.

"Bismarck" managed to produce 5 volleys, but did not hit the Englishman, but only disabled its own radar. Ordering "Prinz Eugen" to take a stand in front, Lutyens increased the speed to 30 knots and changed course in an attempt to get away from the British cruisers. It was successful - at about midnight the connection was lost; "Norfolk" and "Suffolk", confident that the Germans had turned back, headed for the strait, but soon returned to their previous course.

As soon as the first message from the "Norfolk" was reported to Admiral J. Tovi, he turned west and laid down on a course of 280 °, increasing the squadron's speed and intending to intercept the enemy off Iceland the next morning.

Vice Admiral L. Holland received the first message from "Suffolk" at 20.04, 300 miles from the enemy. He ordered Captain 1st Rank R. Karr to lie on a course of 295 ° and increase the speed to 27 knots. After completing the new course, about 50 minutes and watching six destroyers try to keep up with the flagship on a very fresh wave (winds reached 5 points), Holland allowed them to slow down and follow "at an optimal speed." However, the destroyers kept as much traffic as possible all night.

At 23.18 they received an order to line up in "order number 4", i.e. take positions in front of battleship and battle cruiser. At midnight, a report came in that the enemy ships were about 120 miles away, following a course of 200 °.

Soon the British ships reduced their speed to 25 knots, and at 0.17 they laid the course for N.

It was expected that the enemy would be at an opening range of about 1.40, so by 0.15 all preparations for battle were over, and the ships raised their battle flags. Just at this time, the cruisers lost radar contact with the target.

Vice Admiral L. Holland was visibly nervous. At 00.31 he ordered to transmit to the "Prince of Wales": if the enemy is not detected by 2.10, he will lie on the opposite course and will follow them until contact is restored; battleship and battle cruiser will pursue "Bismarck", and "Prinz Eugen" for "Norfolk" and "Suffolk". For history, it remains unknown whether this order was transmitted and whether the cruisers received it .

On the Prince of Wales, the Walrus reconnaissance aircraft was prepared for take-off, however, at 1.40, due to the deterioration of visibility, the ejection had to be canceled, the fuel was drained from the tanks and the aircraft was in a marching mode. After 7 minutes. the flagship raised a flag signal: if at 2.05 the battle cruiser turned to the course of 200 °, the destroyers should continue patrol with the course to N. The visibility was such that the flagship had no confidence in receiving the order by all destroyers. At 2.03 "Hood" went on a course of 200 °.
Since a meeting with the enemy before dawn was unlikely, the team was allowed to rest.

Throughout the night of 23-24 May, "Norfolk" and "Suffolk" pursued the German battleship, which maintained a speed of 27-28 knots.
"Hanging on the tail", the British heavy cruisers from time to time still lost visual contact with the enemy in a shroud of rain . Then they turned on the radar in "Suffolk".

At 2.47, when the "Suffolk" radiometers again saw the target marks on their radar screen and the radiogram reached Vice Admiral L. Holland, the Hood increased the speed to 28 knots.

At 4.00 the distance between the main opponents was approximately 20 miles. At 4.30, visibility improved to 12 miles. Then came the order to prepare for departure the seaplane "Walrus" to the "Prince of Wales". The order was delayed. * The Good was traveling at its maximum speed of 28 knots on an S-O course of 240 °. At 4.50 the more seaworthy "Prince of Wales" stepped forward and the Hood took up a position at the left aft of the hull at 230 °.
A quarter of an hour later, "Hood" again became the flagship.

Meanwhile, the "Norfolk" and "Suffolk" signalmen looked south towards the horizon, waiting for Arctic twilight to shift into daytime. If this had happened at 3.25, the "Bismarck" would have been visually detected 12 miles away. At this point, the battleship began to turn to the right, and when the "Suffolk" also turned to maintain its distance, a sudden strong gust of wind picked up the plane on the catapult and incapacitated it.

At 4.45, "Norfolk" radio operators intercepted a radiogram from "Icarus" destroyer, in which he gave up his place to "Achetes "- destroyer accompanying "Hood" was at the stern of the heavy cruiser. This was the first message from which Rear Admiral W. Wake-Walker could know that the battle cruiser was in the vicinity.
At 5.16 am "Norfolk" signalmen noticed smoke aft to the left, and soon the "Prince of Wales" and "Hood" appeared on the horizon.

On both ships, as early as 05.10 on May 24, 1941, when dawn began, the highest degree of combat readiness was established.

The British were the first to spot the enemy, at 5.35 making contact with a bearing of 335 ° at a distance of 17 miles. Two minutes later, "Hood" and "Prince of Wales" at the same time, on by blue pennant raised on the halyards of the flagship, shifted left to side 40 ° in order to be on the starboard side of the enemy.

At 5.41 "Hood" had a target at a bearing of 80 °, but at 5.49 at the next signal the ships lay down on a course of 300 °.

At the same time, the flagship raised the “G.S.B. 337 L1", which meant "Fire on the German ship located to the left at bearing 337". The left-hand ship turned out to be the "Prinz Eugen", and just before the opening of fire on the halyards "Prince of Wales's" soared the signal “G.O.B. 1 "-" Move the target by one to the right ", ie shoot at "Bismarck".

"Prinz Eugen" detected a target on the port side at about 5.00, but at 5.45, when the signalmen saw the smoke of the British ships, the artillery officer of the German ship mistakenly identified them as an heavy cruiser. An order followed to load the 203-mm guns with the high-explosive shells usually used by the Germans for zeroing.

At dawn, at 5.52, when the distance was reduced to 25,000 yards (22,750 m), "Hood" opened fire on "Bismarck", who immediately responded.

The fire of the "Bismarck" was controlled by the senior artillery officer of the frigate captain Paul Ascher. He already had combat experience - in the same position, Asher commanded the gunners "Admiral Graf Spee" during the battle at La Plata.

From the second volley of "Bismarck" - a fire broke out on the "Hood" in the area of ​​the 102-mm stern gun of the left side, the fire quickly engulfed the entire central part of the ship. The flame had a pink tint, and thick smoke poured from the fire.

"Prince of Wales", whose commander Captain 1st Rank John Leach ordered his artillery officer to independently control the fire, opened fire a minute later than the flagship, but achieved coverage only with the 6th salvo.

At 5.55 on the blue pennant of the flagship "Hood" and "Prince of Wales" they turned 2 points to the left, which opened the firing angles of the main battery bow turret for the latter. The battleship fired the 9th volley. Five minutes later, two blue pennants appeared on "Hood's" halyards - he intended to turn another 2 rumbs.

At that moment "Bismarck" had just fired the 5th salvo - "Hood" was split in two by a powerful explosion, which got between the stern tube and the mainmast. The bow, having turned over, immediately began to sink, and the aft, shrouded in smoke, kept afloat.

After just 8 minutes after the start of the battle, the battle cruiser, for many years the pride of the Royal Navy, disappeared between the waves, and only a cloud of smoke blown away by the wind reminded of the handsome ship.

The salvo of the German battleship missed, but close enough to pierce the rivets of the side plating in the stern of the British heavy cruiser

Before disappearing behind the smoke screen, "Suffolk" managed to respond with nine shots from the side.

Upon seeing the "Suffolk" under attack, the "Norfolk" immediately changed course and charged towards the enemy, opening fire at 18.53.

The "Prince of Wales" guns started working five minutes earlier, and in 8 minutes he managed to make 12 volleys without reaching a single hit. However, this fire was enough for two main battery guns to be out of order due to defects in the turret artillery mount.

"Bismarck" showed no intention of resuming the battle, and Rear Admiral W. Wake-Walker hastened to inform the "Prince of Wales" that he also does not intend to enter into combat contact with the enemy before Admiral J. Tovi approaches.

The skirmish turned out to be fleeting: "Bismarck" again began to move away, and released without any instructions "Prinz Eugen", taking advantage of the snow charge, fled from pursuit.

The British cruisers went further with an anti-submarine zigzag - they entered the area of ​​operations of German submarines.

Admiral J. Tovi, striving first of all to delay the enemy, sent forward "Victorious" so that he tried to force "Bismarck" to reduce the speed by attacking by their torpedo bombers. On "Victorious, which had not yet had time to acquire combat experience, there were only 9 strike aircraft - these were the Swordfish of the 825th squadron. There were 6 more Fulmar fighters from 802 Squadron, while the rest of the hangar space was occupied by partially dismantled Hurricane fighters to be delivered to Malta.

Rear Admiral W. Wake-Walker read the message from the Commander-in-Chief that at about 2200 aircraft from the Victorious would attempt to attack the Bismarck at 14.55 at 20.31. He hoped to expect the appearance of aircraft, which, according to his calculations, could be over the target at about 23.00.

They lost sight of the enemy for some time, but at 23.30 "Norfolk" momentarily "caught" the target at a distance of 13 miles. After 13 minutes torpedo bombers appeared in the sky.

After a short battle between the ships of Rear Admiral W. Wake-Walker and Admiral H. Lutyens, it became obvious that by 23.00 the Victorious would not be able to approach Bismarck for 100 miles.

Then the commander of the 2nd cruising squadron, Rear Admiral E. Curtis, who was holding his flag on the "Galatea" cruise ship, decided to raise the planes at about 22.00, when the distance to the target would be 120 miles, and gave the corresponding order to the commander of to aircraft carrier Captain 2 rank G.Bovilu.

A fresh north-westerly wind was blowing when at 22.08 the Victorious changed course by 330 ° and reduced speed to 15 knots for the torpedo bombers to take off. The weather was, as they say, "worse than you can imagine." It was daylight, but dense clouds and rain created twilight. The flight deck swayed between the frothy crests of the waves and the low clouds in the leaden sky, poured by the cold rain.
At 22.10 from the deck of the aircraft carrier, nine torpedo bombers of the 825th squadron took off hard and disappeared into the clouds. They were led by Lieutenant Commander Eugene Esmonde.

Having gained an altitude of 1.5 thousand feet (about 460 m), the squadron lay on course 2258. The aircraft flew at a speed of about 160 km / h, but the squadron covered 120 miles, separating the British aircraft carrier and the German battleship, for almost two hours.

In conditions of dense low clouds, the very approximate coordinates of the target, which the pilots received before departure, were clearly not enough.

Fortunately for the British, an air radar had already been created for the «Swordfish» torpedo bombers. The radar antenna ASV Mk.10, placed in the fairing, was suspended under the nose of the fuselage, in place of the torpedo, so the radar-equipped aircraft could not play the role of shock.

At about 23.27 a radar operator, bending over the display screen in the second cockpit of one of the Swordfish of 825 Squadron, found a target mark on the right at a course of 16 miles. Three minutes later, a "Bismarck" was seen heading 160 ° through a break in the clouds, but was immediately lost sight of again as the clouds quickly closed in.

The British ships pursuing the Germans had to be to W from them, so the squadron changed course to N-O, then turned to the left.

Soon the radar "caught" two ships, left and right on the course - it turned out to be a pursuit group, and "Suffolk" sent torpedo bombers to "Bismarck", which was 14 miles ahead of it.

At 23.50 the radar operator saw the target straight ahead. The squadron began to descend and, breaking through the clouds, prepared for the attack. However, instead of the German battleship, the pilots saw in front of them the US Coast Guard ship "Madoc", which was drifting. The Bismarck, 6 miles to the south, spotted the planes and immediately opened an intense barrage of fire.

There was no time left to rebuild. All eight * aircraft, each carrying one 18-inch torpedo equipped with a two-channel proximity fuse and mounted at a depth of 31 feet (9.46 m), rushed into the attack from one direction.

Exactly at midnight, three vehicles simultaneously dropped torpedoes, directing them to the port side of the battleship in the midship area. The next three, dropped a minute later by the 2nd group, which went a little further, went to the bow of the "Bismarck's" hull. The 7th vehicle aimed the torpedo at the bow superstructure of the battleship, and the 8th Swordfish, bypassing the Bismarck, dropped the torpedo from the starboard side by 0.02.

It was this last dropped torpedo that hit the starboard side of the battleship in the area of ​​the bridge: two Fulmar fighters, taking off from the Victorious ship at 2300 and observing the results of the attack, reported seeing black smoke having risen from the bow of the battleship and he reduced speed.

Although the armor belt was holding, cracks appeared between the plates and in the side skin, because of which the Bismarck temporarily reduced its speed to 22 knots.

The second pair of fighters, taking off from the Victorious at 1.05, could not detect the enemy, despite all their efforts.

At 13.15 Vice Admiral J. Somerville ordered the commander of the "Sheffeild", Captain 1st Rank Larcom, to separate from "Force H" and move closer to the enemy.

This signal was not duplicated for "Ark Royal", which led to very serious consequences. Half an hour later, the flagship radioed to the Admiralty about this order, the radio was also received at "Ark Royal", but they were in no hurry to decipher, because the report came from Admiral Somerville and was not intended for an aircraft carrier.

Anyway, the pilots of the airplanes patrolling in the air did not suspect that "Sheffield" had left the "Force H" order. Confusion appeared in their reports about the discovered ships - battleship or cruiser? Let us recall that the British did not yet know about the escape of "Prinz Eugen", and any cruiser found in the area of ​​movement of the enemy was quite "legally" identified as an enemy.

Nevertheless, the aircraft torpedoes the "Swordfish" torpedo bombers prepared for departure were set to a depth of 30 feet, which, according to the British, corresponded, more precisely, exceeded the draft of the Bismarck - if the Mk.XII torpedoes had magnetic proximity fuses, then they should have exploded, passing under the keel of the target.

At 14.50, Captain 1st Rank Loben Mound gave the command to take off the strike group. From the flight deck of the "Ark Royal", 15 Swordfish ascended one after another and headed for S. One plane was immediately forced to return due to a malfunction that was discovered after takeoff.
Since the weather and cloud height did not allow counting on timely visual target detection, all hopes were pinned on aircraft radars. They then played a cruel joke with the pilots.

Finding on the indicators the mark of a large target, which was located about 20 miles from the expected position of the German battleship, the squadron, on command, went on the attack without hesitation, being in full confidence that it was "Bismarck". Only after the torpedoes were dropped, which happened at 15.50, the pilots were surprised to find that they had hit the "Sheffield"!

The point was that at the instruction before departure, the pilots were informed that there were no other ships between the cruisers "Norfolk" and "Suffolk", which continued to pursue "Bismarck", and the battleship itself. Therefore, they attacked on the move the "Sheffield", which happened to be "in the wrong" place, which was saved only by timely and very energetic maneuvering.

Frustrated and angry, the pilots had to return to aircraft carrier to hang torpedoes and refuel, which they did at 17.20. Returning, the planes spotted approaching 4th Flotilla destroyers 20 miles to W of "Forte H".

About half an hour later, "Sheffield" spotted "Bismarck" at 48 ° 30 ′ N, 17 ° 20 ′ W and, having informed Vice Admiral J. Somerville of his position, took up a position 10 miles aft of the enemy.

A pair of Swordfish that took off from "Ark Royal" confirmed that "Bismarck" was indeed the target this time.

A hurricane 6-point northwest wind whistled over the sea, it was raining. The height of the clouds was about 600 m. From time to time, 15-meter waves rose above the cockpit, the aircraft carrier experienced a swaying. The crew on deck had to act very quickly, otherwise there was a great risk that the planes would simply fall overboard.

At 19.10 Captain 2nd Rank T. Kood reported on the group's readiness for takeoff. One by one, 15 Swordfish, at the risk of diving into the wave, flew off the deck.

Four planes bypassed the battleship from the stern and began to dive around it through a small low cloud, simultaneously attacking the from the opposite side. The torpedoes dropped by them missed the target, but the planes themselves came under the most severe shelling - the car, which had number 4k, received more than a hundred holes, both crew members were wounded.

Two aircraft of the 5th link were also "lost" in the clouds. Having risen to an altitude of more than 2100 m, the aircraft began to be covered with ice. The 4K machine descended to 300 m, finding the target directly below it, then under the fire of anti-aircraft artillery rose again, having time to notice a torpedo hit on the starboard side of the battleship.

One of the two aircraft of Flight 6 attacked the Bismarck from the starboard side and dropped its torpedo from a distance of 1800 m, aiming at the middle of the hull. The torpedo did not explode. The second vehicle lost its target, but, having flown to the "Sheffield" for target designation, returned and tried to attack the starboard side of the target on low level flight. Intense and accurate fire forced the pilot to deviate from the combat course.

The attack ended at 21.25. The planes attacked "Bismarck" with 13 torpedoes (two were dropped unintentionally), three torpedoes hit the target: the first damaged the left propeller rowing tunnel, the explosion of the second jammed the rudder in the 12 ° position on the left side. Bismarck lost control and began to describe circulation. The third torpedo exploded in the area of ​​the stern superstructure.

While torpedo bombers attacked "Bismarck", "Norfolk" noticed the ship heading southwest.

Rear Admiral W. Wake-Walker immediately ordered fire on the detected target, believing it to be a "Bismarck". However, the "Prince of Wales" was able to confirm that the target was the American cutter "Madoka". Fortunately for the Americans, contact was lost while the British prepared to fire.

At 1.16, turning on a course of 220 °, "Norfolk" suddenly spotted "Bismarck" at bearing 204 ° at a distance of 8 miles. A short artillery duel followed.
"Norfolk" and the "Prince of Wales" turned left to open up the firing zone for their guns, and aimed them at the enemy. At 1.30, according to the radio rangefinder, the British battleship fired two volleys from a distance of 20,000 yards (18,200 m). "Bismarck" also responded with two, and his shells missed.

After this the British lost the enemy again, and Rear Admiral Wake Walker ordered the Suffolk CPT, whose radar station had the greatest reliability of readings, to conduct an independent search.

At 2.29 am "Suffolk" sighted the Bismarck at distance 20,900 yards (19,000 m), bearing 192 °.
The German battleship was heading 160 ° with a course of 20 knots.

The night was clear, visibility 6 miles, "Suffolk"walked zigzagged

At 03.06 the radiometrists recorded Bismarck with the same bearing. But this contact turned out to be the last - the British lost the German battleship. They last observed Prinz Eugen on 24 May at 19.09.

The British threw the battleships "Rodney" and "King George V" with 406-mm and 356-mm guns into the final battle. The first volley at 8:47 was fired by the Rodney. Less than an hour later, the British managed to disable all the "Bismarck's" main caliber turrets. Soon the rest of his guns fell silent. The German battleship was a blazing ruin. "Rodney", trying to deal with the enemy as quickly as possible, until the fuel ran out, even fired at the helpless "Bismarck" with large-caliber 24.5-inch torpedoes, and missed. Although the guns "King George V" and "Rodney" did not always work as expected, together with the heavy cruisers "Norfolk" and "Dorsetshire" they fired almost three thousand (more precisely, 2876) shells ranging in caliber from 133 to 406 mm and achieved approximately 300-400 hits. Flying shells could be seen even with the naked eye.

The surviving officers of the "Bismarck" decided to flood the ship with explosive charges. After 10:20 am, the charges detonated, and the Bismarck began to roll slowly to the port side. Meanwhile, the Dorsetshire launched a torpedo attack: two torpedoes hit the starboard side, then another was fired into the port side. At 10:39 the disfigured battleship capsized and sank. German submarines and aircraft never came to his aid. The British managed to save only 115 people, more than 2,100 died in the water.

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