French Doctrine over time, in general

1870s

French doctrine during the 1870s was in a process of continual updating and improvement. After the Franco-Prussian War, France had to contemplate what could be done to change its army and make it competitive in future military endeavors. During the War, there were substantive problems with doctrine, and France's doctrinal changes in 1869 must see a large amount of the blame of the defeat placed upon them; although they incorporated advancements, they were also fundamentally unsure and represented a half hearted attempt to modernize while maintaining some of the obsolescent features of the period. As a result, France had to make much more extensive changes in the 1870s.

There were several failings that the French Army experienced in the Franco-Prussian war. These included the lack of an effective general staff system, which led to problems of communication, logistics, and overall strategy, inadequate artillery, a doctrine which hedged between the offense and the defense without utilizing France's strengths in either strategically, in mobilization, and in coordination. These were exploited by the Prussians, to the detriment of France's strengths. As a result, it became imperative during the 1870s to fix these and to effectively produce a more modern army capable of operations.

One of the key failings of France during the war was its poor mobilization system, as France didn't truly mobilize its entire strength. This was due to a faulty mobilization system that still left some troops behind for future use instead of sending the maximum possible strength forward. While in a sustained war, training and logistics would be important for this, in the brief duration of the conflict on the borders with the Prussians this was by contrast a decisive part of the lack of necessary French troops. Furthermore, French logistics of command to bring troops forward were poorly placed. These were emphasized as two things that needed to be decisively improved, with doctrine emphasizing the possibiliy of a very short, decisive battle that would take up all the troops necessary at the front in the initial period of the war, as well as longer conflicts. There was also emphasis on a new general staff system and improved training of systems to handle the logistics for supporting this.

With the battlefield itself, doctrine as regarding the combination of the attack and the defense was dangerously flawed. Previous French doctrine before 1869 had put massive emphasis on the attack, with little focus on the defense. After 1869 doctrine had been muddled, without the massive priority on the attack that had been done with the furia francese (calling for French columns on the attack, screened by skirmishers, with supporting units keeping up fire on the enemy) but with an army that wasn't used to defensive conflicts. While defense itself was conducted relatively efficiently by French troops, and in the areas where it was allowed to be put to good effect (Gravelotte being a prime example) it was able to cause decisive casualties onto the enemy that would have otherwise brought victory if not for failings in reserves (another area that will be fixed). However, against the Prussian army with its overriding focus on campaigns of the attack, with artillery support and overwhelming numbers to encircle and destroy enemies, defensive positioning had betrayed the French army into overly small detachments that were cut off and destroyed.

After this, there was a new change. French doctrine changed little regarding its defensive deployments (emphasizing the deployment of infantry in prepared positions on areas like hills and other areas capable of defense), although with additional artillery support and with major focus on strategic reserves to react to enemy offensive actions, and it maintained a higher focus than the attack, although the attack was restored to an extent. Fr nce recognized that it would need to take the initiative in campaigns, and it called for an army of heavy firepower, well trained troops, mobility, and an excellent system of planning and command to be able to conduct offensives. One of the major changes in this regards was that in all areas artillery was raised to a greater status.

Before the Franco-Prussian War, France hadn't ignored artillery, but it was placed at a lower focus than other aspects of its military, and had not properly modernized it - in stark contrast to the strides taken with the Chassepot rifle. The War showed the problems with this, with Prussian artillery proving highly effective. To counter this, France switched entirely in its doctrine, emphasizing artillery as the premier branch of war. Artillery should be deployed as a powerful arm in centralized forces to provide for decisive and controlled actions, using its superior firepower to destroy enemy units with overwhelming bombardment. Artillery in particular is vital to the offensive, for while France believes that on the defene it has a prime advantage against the enemy, on the offense its less numerous soldiers and the need to avoid heavy casualties means that it will have trouble in the succesful prosecution of an offensive. Artillery thus in this role should be used to suppress enemy defenses, silencing enemy artillery and preventing enemies from bringing fire to bear. Much higher priority on the destruction of enemy artillery should be assigned as compared to pre-war planning, since artillery is the king of the battlefield. Artillery should have heavy focus on being mobile to accompany the assault, and its range should not be ignored and should be increased as possible - French artillery in 1870 was routinely out-ranged, and combined with its inferior firepower even in range, as a principal problem relating to its defeat. Another principal problem with French artillery was supply, and there must be continual efforts in producing an effective supply systems to provide for the functioning of artillery in forward formations. Artillery should be mobile in its batteries, and on the offense should be continually seeking to find advantageous positions, while maintaining suppressive fire against the enemy.

Another development of the artillery arm during the Franco-Prussian war was the Mitrailleuse, the French rapid firing bullet-cannon. Although there were problems with its deployment, at battles like Gravelotte where it was deployed effectively, great casualties could be inflicted on the enemy. The problem instead was the way that the Mitrailleuse was deployed, rather than with its actual battlefield performance. Instead of being attached to the artillery arm where they will be outranged and destroyed by enemy artillery, mitrailleuses should be used for the purpose of directly supporting the infantry. Artillery will be deployed at the divisional and corps level, providing decisive fire support at range, silencing enemy artillery and then destroying enemy infantry. Mitrailleuses will by contrast, be deployed to the intent of defeating enemy infantry. On the defense they should always be covered and protected and be firing from prepared positions, complementing the infantry, and there should be gun-shields to protect them from enemy rifle fire. On the offense, covered by friendly artillery which suppresses enemy artillery, they will be used to provide a more developed version of the "furia francese", supplementing the deployed friendly infantry units with mitrailleuses to provide accurate fire against the enemy.

On the defense, mitrailleuses should of course be deployed with friendly troops, while regular artillery will be deployed supporting regular troops. This will happen behind troops, with all units to be deployed in dead ground to protect against enemy field guns where possible. They should not be deployed in front of troops or in vulnerable areas, since artillery is the vital aspect of the battle and must be preserved. There should also be additional emphasis on indirect fire, and not just direct fire.

Cavalry is no longer suitable in the battle itself in the charge against the enemy. The developments of modern firepower means that a cavalry charge will be utterly savaged by enemy artillery, rifles, and enemy quick-firers of their own, means that a cavalry unit conducting charges against the enemy will be silenced. Although there were counter-examples of this - such as Mars-la-Tour with the "death ride" of von Bredow, during other periods of the conflict cavalry attempting to charge the enemy was met with nothing but death - as arguably von Bredow's charge itself experienced, since it took nearly 50% casualties. Instead, the role of cavalry in modern warfare is in screening, reconnaissance, and the pursuit, and rarely in the battlefield itself, although there will be opportunities for its use at some periods if necessary - again, von Bredow's atack being an example, as it was used in desperation to silence French artillery batteries. Although modern artillery will be the primary weapon against such weapons nowadays, it represents a use in desperation to stabilize situations if necessary.

Modern French cavalry tactics largely reflect this. Cavalry has been deployed into two main forces in Metropolitan troops - cavalry divisions, which are used for screening the corps and providing reconnaissane, and dragoons, which are used for rapidly moving rifle-armed infantry around the field of battle and in the same roles of screening and reconnaissance. The saber and the lance are no longer the primary weapons of the cavalry man, instead it is his eyes and the rifle or carbine.

The Franco-Prussian war would not have been as disastrous militarily however, if it had not been for the French problems in communication and coordination. Commanders in corps and divisions did not take the initiative, did not seek to engage the enemy. This attitude was excessively cautious, perhaps inspired by the 1869 doctrine's muddled attitude. Whatever inspired it, it must end. There must be focus on attaining the initiative and cooperation among military commanders. Communicaton must be developed and promoted through railroads and telegraphs, and commanders must be ready to aid each other on the defense, with reserve formations ready to quickly move to each other's aid. Wars are fought by men, not rifles or cannons, and this was a critical failing of the French army, and must be purged through any means necessary. In recent battles of the 1870s, there have been far more succesful operations, such as in the North African Campaign, or the First Swedish campaign (arguably the Second Swedish Campaign's Battle of Oslo represented such a problem but mostly in relations to cooperation between French forces and Danish troops). It is the initiative and ready mobility that will win wars, commanding effectively the artillery and the rifle pit.