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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=okclddpv_9k
-insert spoilers here-
Han Solo dies topkek.
has been effected by the tradition that has grown in the wake of his writing.
Freud himself was not actually an ‘Orthodox Freudian.’ He constantly reminds the reader of the merely ‘provisional’ nature of his insights in his own writing. Freud was a conscientious researcher with a natural gift for phenomenological observation and critique.
For both Freud and Sartre, the individual enters the world tabula rasa.2 The difference between existential psychoanalysis and that of the Freudian kind is not a straightforward disjunction. Their contrariness does not inhere in a comfortable diametrical opposition between existence and essence, but in the alternative emphasis placed on the affective aspects of two different horizons of temporality: the past and the future. It is this tension between the existentialist’s focus on the future and the Freudian fascination with
the past that requires analysis in any attempt to address their moments of coincidence and the differences that divide them. Sartre’s Being and Nothingness establishes the horizon of existential psychotherapy in terms of what it is not. He writes that “…the empirical
scientist, while defining man by his desires, remains the victim of the illusion of substance” (p. 712). Despite Sartre’s respect for Descartes’ philosophy, he
resolutely rejects the idea of consciousness as res cogitans—where it is defined as mental substance. In phenomenological mode, he continues by warning us against the box or container-view of consciousness. The phenomenological concept of intentionality, whereby consciousness is always understood as consciousness of something, is the primary basis of Sartre’s discourse on the psyche. For example, desire originally transcends itself toward possible fulfillment. It is self-transcending in principle.
Let us beware then of considering these desires as little psychic entities dwelling in consciousness; they are consciousness itself in its original projective, transcendent structure, for consciousness is on principle consciousness of something.
Sartre speaks out against empirical psychopathologization. It generalilizes the subject into an objective collection of interconnected states. Like Kierkegaard before him, Sartre is concerned to bring out the importance of an individual in terms of its own ‘particularity’ as distinct from the ‘general states’ by which it is often reduced to a pathological ‘type’ when
he writes….
…we will realize the link between chastity and mysticism, between
fainting and hypocrisy. But we are ignorant always of the concrete
relation between this chastity (this abstinence in relation to a particular
woman, this struggle against a definite temptation) and the individual
content of the mysticism; in the same way psychiatry is too quickly
satisfied when it throws light on the general structures of delusions and
does not seek to comprehend the individual, concrete content of the
psychoses (why this man believes himself to be that particular historical
personality rather than some other; why his compensatory delusion is
satisfied with specifically these ideas of grandeur instead of others, etc.).
But most important of all, these “psychological” explanations refer us
ultimately to inexplicable original givens. p. 715.
Furthermore, each individual is a whole and cannot be broken
down into constitutive parts. The whole is both greater and less than the
sum of its parts, since it remains, for existential reasons, unrealized. Sartre
continues by saying that,
The problem poses itself in approximately these terms: If we admit
that the person is a totality, we can not hope to reconstruct him by an
addition or by an organization of the diverse tendencies which we have
empirically discovered in him. On the contrary, in each inclination,
in each tendency the person expresses himself completely, although
from a different angle, a little as Spinoza’s substance expresses itself
completely in each of its attributes. But if this is so, we should discover
in each tendency, in each attitude of the subject, a meaning which
transcends it.